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:UNITED STATES Federal/Criminal Timely 
SUMMARY: Petr pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful 
use of a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin. 
Each count carried a maximum penalty of four years' 
imprisonment and a fine of $30,000. Contrary to custom 
and practice in the relevant courthouse, petr was given 
consecutive rathEr than concurrent sentences for the two 
counts on which he pleaded guilty. Petr argues that the 
trial judge, when reaching his decision on sentencing, im-




cooperate fully with authorities investigating the heroin 
trans~ctionsto which petr was a party.The trial judge, it 
is argued, abused his d~scretion, and the decision as to 
sentencing ought to be reversed. 
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petr was indicted in a 
five-count indictment--one count of conspiracy and four 
counts of unlawful use of a telephone to facilitate the 
distribution of heroin. In 1975 petr pleaded guilty to the 
conspiracy count and rec e ived a sentence of four-to-fifteen 
years' imprisonment, a three-year special parole term, 
and a $5,000 fine. The CADC vacated the conviction in 1977 
because the Government had not fully disclosed the details of 
the plea bargain agreement t o the DC. United States v. Roberts, 570 
F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977). On remand petr pleaded guilty 
to two of the four counts of unlawful use of the telephone, 
for which he was given maximum four-year consecutive sentences, 
totaling two to eight years imprisonment, and a three-year 
term of special parole. 
Custom and practice in the federal courthouse in 
Washington apparently has it that consecutive sentences for 
two phone counts are a rarity; this was conceded by the pro-
secutor in this case. Petr contends that he was subjected 
to this unusual treatment by the trial judge because he failed 
to cooperate in the government's her?in investigation. This is 
borne out by comments of both the prosecutor and the judge. 
The prosecutor on why he requested maximum consecutive senten-
ces: "Throughout the long process that has occurred from 






he still has refused to cooperate." And again: "Your 
Honor, when you take into account the seriousness of this 
offense . • • I where he refused to assist the Government 
and thereby brought down on his head charges much more 
severe than would have been brought down, it's the 
Government's feeling that the appropriate sentence in this 
case is as we suggested." The trial jridge was equally 
candid: 
Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case 
very carefully. We have noted again you were on 
parole from a bank robbery conviction, which [sic] 
you have had prior involvement with the law. In 
this case you were clearly a dealer, but you had an 
opportunity and failed to cooperate with the Govern-
ment. Accordingly, it is the judgment ~ of the Court 
that on each of these two counts you be sentenced 
to a term of one to four years, that those counts 
be consecutive, and in addition that there shall 
be a three-year term of special parole. We are 
not imposing a fine. 
The CADC affirmed by order the DC's judgment on 
September 22, 1978, but vacated its decision on February 23, 
1979, to supply an amended order. The new order simply va-
cated that portion of the DC judgment imposing the three-year 
special parole term; all other aspects of the DC decision 
were affirmed once again. On April 30, 1979, the CADC 
denied petr's suggestion for rehearing en bane, with Circuit 
Judges Bazelon and MacKinnon filing separate statements. 
Judge Bazelon's statement explaining his vote in favor 
of en bane consideration first sought to distinguish this 
Court's decision in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), 
in which a trial judge's taking into account false testimony of 
a defendant in sentencing him was held allowable. 
i 
- -4-
Judge Bazelon argued that the Grayson decision was based 
on the not unreasomable premise that false testimony provided 
some indication of future transgressions of the law, and on 
the realization that the defendant's right to testify was 
not undermined by the trial judge's action because no one 
has a right to testify untruthfully. In the present case, 
in contrast, petr's refusal to help authorities extended only 
to his unwillingness to name his "powerful suppliers, fearing 
that to do so would endanger his life and possibly incriminate 
himself in additional conspiracies or criminal activities 
without benefit of immunity from prosecution." Thus petr's 
privilege against self-incrimination was threatened. Judge 
Bazelon also found regrettable t he panel's apparent willing-
ness to extend the Grayson rationale to the present case 
absent any opinion explaining the basis of the extension. 
Judge MacKinnon's statement supportive of the denial of 
en bane consideration concentrated on two points. First, 
"It is hard to imagine what lesser sentence than 2 to 8 years 
a court could adjudge for a convicted bank robber who subsequent-
ly is convicted of being a drug distributor." (Emphasis in 
original). Second, Judge MacKinnon found support for the 
trial judge's action in the instant case in Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in which this Court upheld a DC's 
judgment that a guilty plea was voluntary. This Court wrote: 
[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State 
to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends 
a substantial benefit :to the State and who demonstrates 
by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime 
• 
Id. at 753. 
- -
-5-
and to enter the correctional system in 
a frame of mind that affords hope for suc-
cess in rehabilitation over a shorter period 
of time than might otherwise be necessary. 
Cooperating with the Government in law enforce-
ment, Judge MacKinnon argued, is an even greater benefit 
than merely pleading guilty. This cooperation, too, should 
be rewarded, and failure to cooperate should be punished. 
Further, Judge MacKinnon opined as to how prosecutors, in 
the absence of a system in which a trial judge has discretion 
on the issue, would simply press more severe charges against 
those who refuse to cooperate. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the trial judge exceeded 
his discretion in considering petr's failure to cooperate with 
the government and, moreover, that there exists a conflict 
among the circuits on whether a trial judge can consider failure 
to cooperate with the government when sentencing a defendant. 
DISCUSSION: There is indeed a conflict among circuits 
on whether the trial judge may take failure to cooperate into -
account when re_gching- a decision as to the proper sentence. 
The SG's response concedes that two cases, United States v. 
Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. 
Ramos, 572 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1978), have held that a district 
court may not consider a defendant's failure to cooperate as a 
factor in its sentencing determination. No question of self-
incrimination was directly presented _in these cases. Sjimi larly, in a 
case where such a question was directly presented, United States 
v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976), the court of appeals 




"appellants were put to a Robson's choice: remain silent and 
lose the opportunity to be the objects of leniency, or speak 
and run the risk of additional prosecution." Id. at 684. 
In United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), 
in contrast, a case in which self-incrimination is not directly 
involved, the court of appeals upheld the district judge's 
taking into account the defendant's refusal to cooperate when 
sentencing him. And in the instant case the D.C. Circuit 
accomplished the same end by affirming by order . the district 
judge's decision. 
The SG argues that the rationale of United St~tes v. Grayson, 
supra, controls this case, and should lead this Court to deny 
cert. The SG also suggests that, in light of Grayson, it would 
be reasonable to expect more uniformity in courts of appeals' 
decisions in the future. 
It is not at all clear to me that, absent further elaboration 
provided by this Court, Grayson controls the issues in this case. 
The issues are sharply delineated; a conflict exists among the 
circuits; and opposing judicial viewpoints of the case at bar 
have been provided by way of the separate statements of Circuit 
Judges Bazelon and MacKinnon accompanying the denial of petr's 
suggestion for rehearing en bane. I recommend a grant. 
There is a response. 
7/17/79 Kalis Separate statements of 
Bazelon, J., & MacKinnon, 
J., in petn. 
i 
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The question is whether, in the circumstances 
~~~ k ~Ll~ ~
presented, the trial judge properly considered the defendant's J --,,r------------,--------- ~ 
failure to cooperate with the government as an aggravating 
factor in his sentencing decision. 
The briefing on the petitioner's side is somewhat 
uninformative, although I believe the ACLU amicus brief 
adequately outlines the arguments on his side. Petr has three 
points to make about the effect of judicial consideration of his 
noncooperation: ( 1) it violates due process because failure to 
cooperate is not without more probative on any of the factors 
relevant to the sentencing decision; (2) it impermissibly 
burdens his Fifb4 Amendment right to remain silent; and (3) it 
iniects the 
1 • 
trial judge into the plea bargaining process, 
1 





approval of that process, and undermines the appearance of 
just ice by suggesting coll us ion between judge and prosecutor. 
There is also some dispute as to whether the trial judge really 
gave the failure to cooperate any weight. If the Court thinks 
there is any serious question on that factual point, the case 
should probably be DIG' d. However, I think the trial judge's 
comments fairly show that he did consider the allegedly 
impermissible factor. On the merits, it seems to me that the SG 
has demolished each of petr's theories convincingly. 
I Due Process 
When there is not a shred of evidence in the record "---- --------------------~------------
tha t petr refused to coo erate out of fear for his safety or in -
the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights, the refusal is relevant 
-:o::...-
to the sentencing goals of rehabilitation and protection of the 
~ --- ----~ ~ ---
community. The fact that petr was unwilling to take steps to 
C, .,,, 
mitigate the antisocial effects of his illegal activities does 
bear on his attitude toward rehabilitation. His insistence on 
protecting his/ suppliers could also mean - taken together with 
other facts in the record - that petr intends to return to the 
same or similar activities upon his release. 
These considerations are surely as probative of petr's 
11 attitudes toward society and prospects for consideration II as 
the manipulative defiance shown by false testimony at trial. 
Grayson v. United States, 438 U.S. 41, 50 (1978). The only 






refuse to cooperate, just as he may be sorely tempted to 1 ie 
under oath to save himself from conviction. But the Court in 
Grayson rejected this "deterministic" view of human nature 
because our criminal justice system is premised on a belief in 
free will. Id., at 52. When neither the defendant nor his 
attorney suggested any innocent motive for the failure to 
cooperate even at the sentencing hearing when it became 
apparent that the prosecutor was relying on that factor in his 
allocution - the ambiguity is insufficient to make reliance on 
this factor arbitrary. 
Perhaps the most telling argument against petr and the /I-CL U., 
ACLU on this point is ~ t ~ would _permit ~ get: consider~ 
affirmative cooperation as a factor in favor of leniency. Yet -;1L~,._~,,H4 
as Judge MacKinnon and the SG have pointed out, these two ~ 
propositions are but two sides of the same coin. Whether the 
~ 
general principle is viewed as extra harshness for . -noncooperation or extra leniency for cooperation, the result is 
that, all things being equal, there are two classes of 
defendants one who did not cooperate receiving heavier 
sentences and one who did receiving lighter ones. Al though no 
one has argued it, I suppose one could answer by saying that two 
classes exist with the rule of leniency alone those who 
receive favorable and those who receive neutral treatment. If a 
judge then singles out certain noncooperators for additional 
punishment, he crates a third class and changes the pattern that 






that sentencing is, under the prevailing view, a highly 
individualized process. All things are never equal, and the 
defendant's cooperation or failure to cooperate is given meaning 
only in conj unction with other aspects of his character and 
conduct. It simply makes no sense to say that one is relevant 
and the other is not. 
In the last analysis, the difference between the SG 
and the amicus brief is a matter of burden of proof. In the 
amicus' view, the trial judge may consider the failure to 
cooperate as a sign of poor rehabilitative prospects if he has -
eliminated all equally plausible reasons for it. In the SG's 
view, the defendant must produce some plausible reason to 
explain it. When a defendant is represented by counsel in the 
context of a proceeding that this Court has held must consider 
all aspects of a defendant's character drawing on the broadest 
possible spectrum of information, the latter view is neither 
arbitrary nor unfair. 
seems plainly right. -
From a due process standpoint, the SG 
II Fifth Amendment 
I see no merit in the Fifth Amendment ar ument. Petr, 
represented by counsel, twice underwent a lengthy process of 
plea negotiations culminating in a bargain. He was found to 
have expressly waived his Fifth Amendment rights in connection 
with disclosures as to his involvement in the counts alleged in 





including, at one point, c~spi~ acy. At the sentencing hearing / 
he was presented with the prosecutor's argument for enhanced 
sentence due to noncooperation and offered no response. 
Throughout the entire process he never suggested that he was 
relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege - indeed to the extent --------------------he responded he gave a reason (that he was "not that involved" 
in the conspiracy) that the trial judge appears to have taken as 
false. 
In the circumstances presented, it seems to me that 
the defendant was not punished for his silence. Indeed he was 
not silent. He voluntarily went to the U.S. Attorney, expressly 
waived his Fifth Amendment rights and incriminated himself at 
Nor did he ever "cut off questioning" in the some 1 eng th. 
Miranda sense. Instead, he gave evasive answers. Moreover, he -U-0 
~ 
was never subjected to the pressures of custodial questioning -
~ 
underlying Miranda and his silence was not "insolubly ambiguous" 
as in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Finally, petr's 
lawyer himself raised the cooperation issue at the sentencing 
hearing. The lawyer never objected to consideration of the 
subject during the sentencing hearing. I am not sure that each 
of these circumstances, standing alone, would be sufficient to 
support the conclusion that there has been no unconstitutional 
burden on the right to remain silent. In combination, however, 
they overwhelmingly do so. Thus, the Court need not entirely 
reject the holdings of those Courts of Appeals which have 





United States, 596 F.2d 74 (CA2 1979); United States v. Rogers, 
504 F.2d 1079, 1085 (CA5 1974). But see United States v. 
Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 154 (CA2 1979); United States v. Miller, 
589 F.2d 1117 (CA2 1978). 
The Court need not go so far as to hold that the state 
may encourage self-incriminating cooperation to the same extent 
as it may encourage guilty pleas. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 
439 U.S. 212, 218-224 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes 434 U.S. 
357, 363-365 (1978); Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742, 752-
753 (1970). The Court need not even hold that failure to 
cooperate is always a permissible factor. If petr expressly 
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, this might well be a 
different case. But on the facts of presented, petr has no 
basis for his Fifth Amendment claim. 
III Supervisory issues 
Judge Bazelon urged 
rehearing en bane that 
in his statement in support of 
permitting consideration of 
noncooperation would skew the bargaining power in the plea 
negotiation process. Amici repeat this argument and also urge 
that the trtal judge's conduct suggested collusion with the 
prosecutor. Both these factors are said to require intervention 
by this Court in the exercise of its supervisory power over the 
federal judiciary, even if there is no constitutional or 
statutory infirmity in the sentence. 







warrant the extraordinary action proposed. This Court 
ordinarily will not intrude upon a sentencing judge's discretion 
if there is no constitutional or statutory basis for doing so. 
Dorszynski v. United States 418 U.S. 424, 440-441 ( 1974). It 
would be appropriate to do so, perhaps, if the district court 
had actively asserted his authority in the course of the 
bargaining process. But no such events took place in this case. 
Rather the court reviewed the events leading up to the crime and 
the petr' s conduct thereafter in the usual way. There is no 
suggestion that the court announced any "differential policy" of 
harsher sentencing for noncooperators in every case, or that the 
court departed in any way from the usual model of individualized 
sentencing based on the entire record. Assuming there is no due 
process or Fifth Amendment violation, I see no basis for a 
reviewing court to intervene. 
CONCLUSION 
It may be unfortunate that the Court took this case, 
for the facts are strongly stacked against petr. The Fifth 
------------
Amendment argument appears to be his strongest, yet on this 
record it has no apparent merit. I would vote to affirm, but 
would hope to see an opinion written narrowly enough to permit a 
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No. 78-1793 Roberts v. United States 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly 
considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a heroin 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
The petitioner, Winfield Roberts, accompanied Cecilia 
Payne to the office of the United States Attorney for the 
District of Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government 
surveillance previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned 
by Payne was used to transport heroin in the District. She told 
~ 
~f-
( investigators that she occasionally 






suggestion, the prosecutor asked petitioner if he would answer 
~L fte.,4~~-•ff: ~ At.. 
some questions. ~Pc~itioner was given the warnings required by · -~ 
ljk~ ~, 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966~~told that he was 
free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would stay, 
the prosecutor asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, the 
principal target of the heroin investigation at that time. 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton on 
several occasions. Confessing that he had discussed drug 
2. 
transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted telephone 
conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code words 
.a,,~ ct&)~ 
used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, 
/\ 
however, he gave evasive answers. Although the prosecutor 
warned petitioner that the extent of his cooperation would 
determine the charges brought against him, he provided no 
further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to 
distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841, 846, and four counts of 
using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b).l/ He retained a lawyer, who rejected the 
prosecutor's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's 
assistance. In March, 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty 
to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 
years' imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 
fine. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
that the terms of the plea agreement were not disclosed fully to 
the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999 (CADC 
1977). 
0 d . . ~ f} ? . f n reman , pet1t1oner pleade guilty to two counts o 
I\ 
telephone misuse under an agreement permitting the government to 
allocute for a substantial sentence. The prosecutor filed a 
memorandum recommending consecutive sentences of 16 to 48 months 
-; 
3. 
on each count and a$ 5,000 fine. 2/ After summarizing 
petitioner's record, which included a previous conviction for 10 
counts of bank robbery as well as his voluntary confession and 
his refusal to name suppliers, the memorandum emphasized the 
tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no family 
responsibilities, the government theorized that he sold heroin 
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and on 
parole. The memorandum concluded that stern treatment was 
required to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for 
personal profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that 
petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal, 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. 
Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent 
sentences that would result in his immediate release. He 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved '< y 
in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the request for 
probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's refusal to 
cooperate in the investigation over the course of "many, many 




was "not in a position [to ask the sentencing judge] to take 
into account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that 
the defendant has cooperated . .• " Ibid. Stressing the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or 
mitigation, the government v;,e~ -y recommended a substantial 
prison term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of 
one to four years on each count and a special parole term of 
three years, but declined to impose a fine. The Court listed 
three factors that had influenced the sentence: (i) Petitioner 
was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
offense; (ii) he was a dealer; and (iii) he failed to cooperate 
with the government. l/ Petitioner again appealed, contending for 
the first time that the sentencing court's consideration of his 
failure to cooperate was improper. The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but 
otherwise affirmed the judgment. We granted certiorari, 
U.S. , and we now affirm. 
II 
~k 
Petitioner c;:.onbenss that his sentence must be vacated 
on three distinct grounds. First, he argues that the District 
Court rationally could not assume that his failure to assist the 






sincere desire for rehabilitation. He concludes that his 
sentence was imposed arbitrarily, without Due Process of Law. 
Second, petitioner argues that he relied on a constitutional 
~~-~~-right to stand silent in the face of government  i~= iQJl. To 
penalize that silence is to burden the exercise of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Third, 
petitioner contends that the District Court interfered with the 
plea bargaining process and created an appearance of collusion 
between court and prosecutor. Petitioner urges the Court to 
exercise its supervisory power to correct the misconduct of a 
federal court. In the circumstances presented, these 
contentions lack merit. 
'> 
A 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the 
United States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. 
Congress has directed that 
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 
which a court of the United States may receive and 
consider for the purpose of imposing an 
appropriate sentence." 18 u.s.c. § 3577. 
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of 
the modern concept of individualized punishment that "fit[s] the 
6. 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York 337 
U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 
45-50 (1978). Two terms ago we reaffirmed the "fundamental 
sentencing principle" that "'a judge may appropriately conduct 
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the 
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it 
may come.'" United States v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See also 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, 
sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the 
basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); see Townsend v. 
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741 (1948). 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
facts upon which the sentencing court relied are essentially 
undisputed. No one ~ t petitioner refused repeated 
requests for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor 
does petitioner contend that he could not have provided the 
requested assistance had he desired to do so. Moreover, 
petitioner concedes that cooperation with the authorities is a 
"laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational connection to a 
defendant's willingness to shape up and change his behavior." 
Petitioner's Brief 17.4/ Unless otherwise explained, a 
defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation of ongoing 
7 • 
.kcc-4P.-t 
crimes gives rise to an inference that these dgsirabl-e attitudes 
are lacking. The petitioner, for example, rejected an 
opportunity to reduce the antisocial effects of his illegal 
activity by exposing the heroin conspiracy.2/ He ignored the 
"obligations of community life" that must be recognized before 
rehabilitation can begin, see Hart, The Aims of the Criminal 
Law, 32 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 (1958), in order to adhere 
0-
to theAmoral code of the conspiracy. Moreover, he preserved his 
~ ~~ "-------"' 
ability to resume~ .u.la-t ions with 
wn ~"k lhese consideration~ levant 
upon release. 
to the "'likelihood 
~ 
that he will transgress no more, the hope that he may respond to 
rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future career, 
[and] the degree to which he does or does not deem himself at 
war with his society.'" United States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, 
quoting United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 
1974). 
. . .. ~ :=ti. ~ ---::::: -- ------------- - -=-
---=--"""."" ~ ---::. 
· Petitioner does not challenge the relevance of these 
l 
observations. He now contends, however, that his refusal to 
cooperate was motivated by entirely different concerns. He 
asserts that the disclosures sought by the ~ would 
have implicated him in numerous additional crimes. As an 
~ 
informer, petitioner says, he would have been exposed to a 
~ 
serious risk of physical retaliation. These arguments 






~ ~~~ ~ 
a~n,--pria-t.-e.J.¥-, coJJlg ae\. presented to But 
they do not impugn the constitutionality of the sentence in this 
case, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's 
brief on appeal. Although the government warned petitioner that 
his intransigence would be used against him, neither he nor his 
lawyer ever suggested that he feared retaliation or self-
incrimination. Indeed, counsel volunteered that petitioner 
'7 ~ uld not name suppliers because he "wasn't that involved." Even C 
after the prosecutor suggested that petitioner's failure to 
cooperate was a product of continued criminal intent, counsel 
failed to raise the possibility of alternative motivations. 
-----[ Having afforded the petitioner ample opportunity to explain his 
behavior and having received an explanation that was 
disingenuous on its face, the District Court properly could 
conclude that no legitimate explanation was availab:::J 
Nothing in the Constitution required the District 
Court to consider mitigating factors that were not brought to 
its attention by the defense. Although it ~ ~ is possible to 
' u:lu-4/...fct 
~ n with absolute precision the motives for individual 
behavior, modern concepts of sentencing required the court to 
~ 
assess the petitioner's character on the basis of ooAdttct 
~
reve9led in the record. The petitioner's refusal to cooperate • 
was not so "insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's 
reliance upon it "fundamentally unfair." Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
9. 
U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976). Indeed, at the time of sentencing the 
prosecutor's characterization was not seriously contested. See 
Williams v. New York, supra, at 244. As the District Court's 
conclusions were based rationally on the facts before it, 
petitioner's belated challenge must fail. 
B 
AB'1::houg h LJal\: OPet it ioner was not a witness in 
j .10,ai.p i.o.l 12PW<:cd i 5'h J. the gove~ ~ pea ted 1 y so ugh t !.tt 
fu, ~~$ ~~ i-.. W-4( ~ 
t ~ co-conspirators~ He now contends that his 
~ 
refusal to 1:-esti~y was an exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, and that the District 
Court improperly "punished" him for his "silence." Petitioner's 
failure to make his objections known, either to the prosecutor 
or to the sentencing court, is fatal to this claim. 
At least where the government has no substantial 
reason to believe that requested disclosures will be 
incriminating, a prospective witness cannot complain that he was 
forced to testify against himself unless he claims the 
privilege. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-657 
(1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); 
Vaj tauer v. Commissioner of _Immigration, 27 3 U.S. 1 03, 11 2-113 
(1927); see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 504, 574-575 
(1976); Id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the 
1 0. 
judgment). The privilege may be "claimed" by silence only when 
some circumstance "den[ies] the individual a 'free choice to 
admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'" Garner, supra, at 
657, quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941). 
These principles effect "an appropriate accommodation of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege and the generally applicable principle 
that governments have the right to everyone's testimony." Id., 
at 655 . ..W9 t.biok tha-t.khey apply with equal force when 
-~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ) J l'- --- "1"111{ -
witness refuses to speak and explains his refusal in a way that 
I\ 
does not put the government on notice that the privilege has 
been claimed. 
In this case, the petitioner admitted his own 
involvement in the heroin conspiracy in his first interview with 
the authorities. He refused to respond only when the 
I A~ .. I. A., ~ ....... ~-- ~L;,.. ~ 
~r-1 ~~z:~ ~ 
questioning :.::._s designed to A i mpli e"°"" other Persons A a= """"""~ 
14-e ~ ..... ~-=-"'f ~le .. ~,<. ~ 
/\ i ~F-im-i:ne:Yerr not:~ b y any pri v i J eg~. See United States 
v. Mandujano, 425 U.S., at 572; Rogers v. United States, 340 
.J,ude~,u_., ~ ~~~h...> 
U.S. 367, 370-375 (1951). I-RS-tQ.ae ~tt-Ss e rt1Ag th e privile 9 e 
.:.:. ~-~ 
ag,,a_iru;t »eJ~ocr:iiRin~~ petitioner 
Defense counsel himself directed the sentencing court's 
attention to petitioner's confession and his alleged inability 
to name suppliers. This combination of express waivers and a 
volunteered explanation unrelated to the Fifth Amendment could 
~ 
~"'d<cf~ - ,0 
11. 
not have alerted the prosecutor or the judge to any danger of 
self-incrimination. Nor was the petitioner's ability to claim 
the privilege inhibited in any way. He was represented by 
counsel who bargained actively with the prosecution over a 
period of three years, knowing that petitioner's refusal to 
cooperate would be held against him. Neither the unique 
pressures of custodial interrogation, Garner, supra, at 657, see 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), nor the potentially 
misleading effect of Miranda warnings, see Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 
at 618, can explain petitioner's failure to assert his rights. 
No other coercive factor has been suggested, and we are aware of 
none.'}_/ 
Where, as here, nothing interferes with a defendant's 
free and informed choice, the simple requirement that he present 
his claim of privilege to the prosecutor or to the sentencing 
~ 
court eafl impose no burden er eRill upon the exercise of Fifth 
~ 
Amendment rights. Had petitioner invoked the privilege when his 
silence allegedly was penalized, the District Court could have 
evaluated his claim and the prosecutor could have considered 
whether to displace it with immunity. See Garner, supra, at 658 
n. 11. No right secured by the Constitution permitted the 
petitioner to circumvent these procedures by presenting his 
Fifth Amendment claim as an "afterthought" on appeal. See 




Absent constitutional infirmity, this Court repeatedly 
has declined to review the propriety of sentences imposed within 
the limits set by statute. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 
U.S. 424, 440-441 (1974); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 
393 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 
(1932). The practice derives from established tradition vesting 
the sentencing function exclusively in the trial courts. We see 
no reason to depart from it in this case. 
Nothing in the record suggests that the District Court 
"participated" in plea bargaining discussions in violation of 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e) (1). See ABA Standards Relating to 
Pleas of Guilty§ 3.3(1) (Approved Draft, 1968). The court did 
not attempt to persuade the petitioner to cooperate, and it 
announced no "policy of differential sentencing" for those who 
cooperate and those who do not. It merely undertook a 
~ ~ 
r~roseeeti¥e review of petitioner's cha~act9r and conduct in 
" 
accordance with the applicable law. See 18 u.s.c. § 3577; Fed. 
R. Crim. Proc. 32(c). Since it is based on all the relevant 
facts, this inquiry can have no effect on a defendant's ability 
7 
J to demand immunity in exchange for cooperation, or to trade his 
guilty plea for charging concessions. The "relatively equal 
bargaining power"!/ of the prosecution and the defense is 
unimpaired. 
1 3. 
Nor did the sentence imposed in this case create an 
appearance of collusion between court and prosecution. Each 
side had the same opportunity to submit its interpretation of 
the conduct relied on by the court. The government made its 
position known to defense counsel in advance, and the court 
specifically invited counsel to respond to the prosecutor's oral 
submission. As we discern no impropriety, we find no occasion 
to exercise our supervisory power. 
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Motion of Roberts for Leave to 
File a Supplemental Brief After 
Argument 
CA (D. C.) UNITED STATES 
SUMMARY: Petr asks for leave to file a supplmental brief 
after oral argument because several important transcripts (bearing 
on resp 's waiver claim) were unavailable at the time petr 's brief 
and appendix were filed . 
DISCUSSION : Rule 41(6) provides that leave of court is 
required to file a brief after oral argument . The usual practice 









TO: Ellen DATE: Feb. 18, 1980 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Roberts 
As you will see from some "off the cuff" dictation, 
I have attempted to suqqest a wav to restructure our opinion. 
The first draft is structured on the assumption 
that petitioner relied on three separate and distinct 
arquments. In fact, his miserable brief - includinq his 
belated reply brief - do not identify three seoarate qrounds. 
Rather, his counsel wanders all over the lot. The question 
stated bears little or no relation to the arqument 
emphasized, either in the briefs or at oral arqument. 
Virtually his only arqument is that there was a riqht to 
remain silent, and this riqht derived the Fifth Amendment and 
Miranda warninqs. 
The three part analysis comes from the SG's brief 
which I find unnecessarily lonq and complicated. We all 
aqree that this is a relatively simple case. I suqqest that 
we divide the analysis portion of our hrief (i.e., Part II) 
into two subparts. The first would be your subpart A from 
... 
- . e 
paqe 5 throuqh most of paae 7. This arques, quite -
persuasivelv, the relevancv to proper sentencinq of whether 
or not - and the extent to which - a convicted defP.ndant 
cooperates. I have no substantial changes to suqqest as to 
this. 
2. 
The second subpart would address petitioner's 
principal argument: that he had a constitutional right to 
remain silent, includinq a right not to assert the Fifth 
Amendment. The present draft moves into this with the 
paraqraph near the bottom of paqe 7 ana continues throuah 
paqe 11. Petitioner has blurred the Fifth Amendment right 
not to be compelled to incriminate oneself and the riqht of 
silence included in the Miranda warninas. In this case, it 
is not claimed that there was any coersive interroqation, and 
therefore I do not think the Miranda arqument adds anvthinq 
to the Fifth Amendment claim. 
Without benefit of readinq the cases I've cited, 
and relyinq on what you have written and the SG's brief, I 
have dictated an outline for subpart B. 
This will require thouqhtful editinq or rewritinq 
and cite checking. 
I would omit from the text of our opinion subpart 
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made at all, the point addressen in subpart C was not 
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lfp/ss 2/18/80 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Ellen DATE: Feb. 18, 1980 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Roberts 
As you will see from some "off the cuff" dictation, 
I have attempted to suggest a way to restructure our opinion. 
The first draft is structured on the assumption 
that petitioner relied on three separate and distinct 
arguments. In fact, his miserable brief - including his 
belated reply brief - do not identify three separate qrounds. 
Rather, his counsel wanders all over the lot. The question 
stated bears little or no relation to the argument 
emphasized, either in the briefs or at oral argument. 
Virtually his only argument is that there was a right to 
remain silent, and this right derived~ ifth Amendment and 
Miranda warnings. 
The three part analysis comes from the SG's brief 
which I find unnecessarily long and complicated. We all 
agree that this is a relatively simple case. I suggest that 
we divide the analysis portion of our brief (i.e., Part II) 
into two subparts. The first would be your subpart A from 
,,..,. ...- , 
page 5 through most of paqe 7. This argues, quite 
persuasively, the relevancy to proper sentencing of whether 
or not - and the extent to which - a convicted defendant 
cooperates. I have no substantial changes to suggest as to 
this. 
2. 
The second subpart would address petitioner's 
principal argument: that he had a constitutional right to 
remain silent, including a right not to assert the Fifth 
Amendment. The present draft moves into this with the 
paragraph near the bottom of page 7 and continues through 
page 11. Petitioner has blurred the Fifth Amendment right 
not to be compelled to incriminate oneself and the right of 
silence included in the Miranda warnings. In this case, it 
is not claimed that there was any coersive interrogation, and 
therefore I do not think the Miranda~argument adds anything 
to the Fifth Amendment claim. 
Without benefit of reading the cases I've cited, 
and relying on what you have written and the SG's brief, I 
have dictated an outline for subpart B. 
This will require thoughtful editing or rewriting 
and cite checking. J+-~ ~ 4-<.., ~ t!-.-f-~ 
I would omit from the text of our opinion subpart 
C, and relegate it - in condensed form - to a footnote. If 
.. 
made at all, the point addressed in subpart C was not 







lfp/ss 2/18/80 Rider A, p. 7 (Roberts) M 
We conclude, therefore, that petitioner's 
failure to cooperate with the government under the 
facts of this case clearly was relevant to the 
determination of an appropriate sentence. 
B 
Petitioner does not seriously challenge 
the foregoing conclusion. He contends, rather, 
that "the district court erroneously punished [him] 
for exercising his Fifth Amendment right against 
self incrimination". Pet. br. 8. He now asserts 
that the disclosures sought by the government would 
have implicated him in numerous additional crimes. 
As an informer, petitioner also says that he would 
have been exposed to a serious risk of physical 
retaliation. These arguments would have merited 
serious consideration if they had been properly 
presented to the sentencing judge. But each was 
raised for the first time in petitioner's brief on 
appeal. Although the government warned petitioner 
that his intransigency would be used against him, 
neither he or his counsel ever afforded the 
sentencing judge an opportunity to consider the 
arguments he now advances. Even after the 
prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate 
2. 
could be viewed as evidence of continued criminal 
intent, petitioner remained silent. 
Petitioner insists, nevertheless, that he 
had a constitutional right to remain silent, and 
that no adverse inferences could be drawn from the 
exercise of that right. He reasons that at his 
first encounter with the prosecutor he was given 
Miranda warnings in which he was advised of the 
right to remain silent. Although he then 
voluntarily confessed to the offenses for which he 
was later indicted, he argues that he relied on the 
right to remain silent in refusing to identify his 
suppliers of heroin or his co-conspirators. 
We find these arguments singularly 
unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self incrimination is not self 
executing. It may not be relied upon unless it is 
invoked in a timely fashion. Garner v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976). In this case, as 
in Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 
113 (1927), petitioner "did not assert his 
privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld 
his testimony because there was any ground for fear 
3. 
of self incrimination. His assertion of it here is 
evidently an after thought." The Court added in 
Vajtauer that "[t]he privilege may not be relied on 
and must be deemed waived if it is not in some 
manner fairly brought to the attention of the 
tribunal which must pass upon it". Id. The 
principle that the privilege must be asserted 
applies with equal force whether the claim is made 
before conviction or following conviction and prior 
to sentencing. Thus, if indeed petitioner had 
believed that his failure to cooperate was 
privileged he should have invoked it at a time when 
the sentencing court could have determined if there 
was a legitimate basis for relying upon the Fifth 
Amendment.* 
*See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 483 
(1951); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-
375 (19 ); Mason v. United States, 344 U.S. 362, ----364 - 367 (1917). It is the duty of a court to 
determine whether there is in fact a legitimate 
basis for relying upon the Fifth Amendment. The 
privilege may not be employed as a tactic to shield 
a person simply from giving testimony he would 
prefer not to give. 
4. 
See United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 
(CA2 1970), cert. den., 402 U.S. 911 (1971). 
Petitioner seeks to avoid the force of 
the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege must be 
asserted by arguing that he was given Miranda 
warnings guaranteeing to him the right to remain 
silent. The right to silence, required to be 
stated in Miranda warnings, is derived from the 
Fifth Amendment privilege and adds nothing to it. 
This privilege is applicable only to compelled or 
coerced self incrimination. The Miranda 
requirement for specific warnings is grounded on 
the Court's conclusion that custodial interrogation 
is inherently coercive. Miranda, at The 
warnings were designed to protect persons explosed 
to such interrogation without the assistance of 
counsel or until such assistance had been waived. 
In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 
n. 5 (1977) the Court said: 
"All Miranda's safeguards, which are 
designed to avoid the coercive 
atmosphere, rest on the overbearing 
compulsion which the Court thought was 
caused by isolation of a suspect in 
police custody". 
In this case, there was no custodial interrogation. 
5. 
Petitioner's confession was volunteered at his 
first interview with the prosecutor in 1975, after 
Miranda warnings had been given and at a time when 
he was free to leave. He makes no claim that it 
was coerced. Thereafter he had counsel who 
participated in all proceedings, and who was fully 
apprised - as was petitioner - that his failure to 
cooperate would be brought to the attention of the 
court and reasonably could be expected to affect 
7 the sentence imposed. 
sentence was not imposed until 
Petitioner's final 
(1978). As noted above, neither petitioner nor his 
counsel - during this entire period - claimed that 
hisunwillingness to provide vital information 
needed by the government was based on a perceived 
constitutional right to remain silent or upon any 
fear of self incrimination. 
t/-
lfp/ss 2/18/80 Rider A, fn / (Roberts) 
We do note that Circuit Judge MacKinnon, author of 
the opinion reversing petitioner's first 
conviction, stated - on the basis of his "complete 
familiarity with the facts of this entire case" -
that the record does not support the assertion that 
petitioner obtained an "enhanced sentence" for his 
failure to cooperate. The sentence of two to eight 
years' imprisonment was not a severe one for a 
"substantial drug distributor", engaging in that 
criminal conduct while on parole from a prior 
conviction for bank robbery. Indeed, as Judge 
MacKinnon observed, the sentence can be viewed as 
"a very light" one. Separate statement by Judge 
MacKinnon upon denial of rehearing en bane, pet. 
app. 21a. 
i ., 
lfp/ss 2/18/80 Rider A, p. 7 (Roberts) 
We conclude, therefore, that petitioner's 
failure to cooperate with the government under the 
facts of this case clearly was relevant to the 
determination of an appropriate sentence. 
B 
Petitioner does not seriously challenge 
the foregoing conclusion. He contends, rather, 
that "the district court erroneously punished [him] 
for exercising his Fifth Amendment right against 
self incrimination". Pet. br. 8. He now asserts 
-that the disclosures sought by the government would 
have implicated him in numerous additional crimes. 
As an informer, petitioner also says that he would 
have been exposed to a serious risk of physical 
retaliation. These arguments would have merited 
serious consideration if they had been properly 
presented to the sentencing judge. But each was 
raised for the first time in petitioner's brief on 
appeal. Although the government warned petitioner 
that his intransigency would be used against him, 
neither he or his counsel ever afforded the 
sentencing judge an opportunity to consider the 
arguments he now advances. Even after the 
prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate 
~ ~ 
2. 
could be viewed as evidence of continued criminal 
intent, petitioner remained silent. 
Petitioner insists, nevertheless, that he 
had a constitutional right to remain silent, and 
that no adverse inferences could be drawn from the 
exercise of that right.J He reasons that at his 
first encounter with the prosecutor he was given 
Miranda warnings in which he was advised of the 
right to ,remain silent. Although he then 
voluntarily confessed to the offenses for which he 
was later indicted, he argues that he relied on the 
right to remain silent in refusing to identify his 
suppliers of heroin or his co-conspirators. 
We find these arguments singularly 
unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self incrimination is not self 
executing. It may not be relied upon unless it is 
invoked in a timely fashion. Garner v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976). In this case, as 
in Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 
113 (1927), petitioner "did not assert his 
privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld 
his testimony because there was any ground for fear 
., ,., 
3. 
of self incrimination. His assertion of it here is 
evidently an after thought." The Court added in 
Vajtauer that "[t]he privilege may not be relied on 
and must be deemed waived if it is not in some 
manner fairly brought to the attention of the 
tribunal which must pass upon it". Id. The 
principle that the privilege must be asserted 
applies with equal force whether the claim is made 
before conviction or following conviction and prior 
to sentencing. Thus, if indeed petitioner had 
believed that his failure to cooperate was 
privileged he should have invoked it at a time when 
the sentencing court could have determined if there 
was a legitimate basis for relying upon the Fifth 
Amendment.* 
*See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 483 
(1951); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-
375 (19 ); Mason v. United States, 344 U.S. 362, 
364-367-(1917). It is the duty of a court to 
determine whether there is in fact a legitimate 
basis for relying upon the Fifth Amendment. The 
privilege may not be employed as a tactic to shield 
a person simply from giving testimony he would 





,.. . l'l 
4. 
See United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 
(CA2 1970), cert. den., 402 U.S. 911 (1971). 
Petitioner seeks to avoid the force of 
the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege must be 
asserted by arguing that he was given Miranda 
warnings guaranteeing to him the right to remain 
silent. The right to silence, required to be 
stated in Miranda warnings, is derived from the 
Fifth Amendment privilege and adds nothing to it. 
This privilege is applicable only to compelled or 
coerced self incrimination. The Miranda 
requirement for specific warnings is grounded on 
the Court's conclusion that custodial interrogation 
is inherently coercive. Miranda, at The 
warnings were designed to protect persons expf o~ed 
to such interrogation without the assistance of 
counsel or until such assistance had been waived. 
In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 
n. 5 (1977) the Court said: 
"All Miranda's safeguards, which are 
designed to avoid the coercive 
atmosphere, rest on the overbearing 
compulsion which the Court thought was 
caused by isolation of a suspect in 
police custody". 
In this case, there was no custodial interrogation. 
I \ ~ 
5. 
Petitioner's confession was volunteered at his 
first interview with the prosecutor in 1975, after 
Miranda warnings had been given and at a time when 
he was free to leave. He makes no claim that it 
was coerced. Thereafter he had counsel who 
participated in all proceedings, and who was fully 
apprised - as was petitioner - that his failure to 
cooperate would be brought to the attention of the 
court and reasonably could be expected to affect 
~ the sentence imposed. 
/ 
sentence was not imposed until 
Petitioner's final 
I\ 
(1978). As noted above, neither petitioner nor his 
counsel - during this entire period - claimed that 
hisunwillingness to provide vital information 
needed by the government was based on a perceived 
constitutional right to remain silent or upon any 




ll On the basis of his intercepted conversations with 
Thornton, petitioner apparently could have been indicted for 13 
counts of unlawful use of the telephone. App. 36. 
II The maximum sentence on each count was four years' 
imprisonment and a$ 30,000 fine. 21 u.s.c. § 843(c). The 
prosecutor conceded that the usual practice in the District 
Court was to impose concurrent sentences for multiple uses of 
the telephone to distribute heroin. But the governing statute 
explicitly provides that "each separate use of [the telephone] 
shall be a separate offense · •.. " 21 U.S.C. § 843( b). Since 
the statute clearly authorizes separate punishment, consecutive 
u~• 
sentences ~ permissible in appropriate cases. 
A 
ii Before imposing sentence, the court explained: 
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very 
carefully. We have noted again you were on parole 
from a bank robbery conviction, which you have had 
prior involvement with the law. In this case you 
were clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity 
to cooperate with the Government." App. 40. 
±I See, e.g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty§ 
1. 8(a) (v) (Approved Draft, 1968); id., at 48-49; Lumbard, 
Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 413 (1965); cf. 
FN2. 
R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 (1975). We doubt 
that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing 
the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. 
I~~"""~~~~~~ 
A'fhe petitioner's sentence of two to eight years' imprisonment, 
I -~~ I~~~ 
f~ a rgua~ly was not a severe one for aAdrug 
'\ 
distributor with a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
I\ ~ See 
\ 
Separate Statement by Circuit Judge MacKinnonon upon denial of 
~~~ I ~..C.. ~ '~~ ~~ ~
rehearing en bane, Pet. App. 21a. The sentence was ~ 
~~~"LJ 
/aJHcA_~ 
substantially shorter than the sentence imposed after the ___ j 
petitioner's first plea of guilty. We do not believe, however, 
that the analysis is advanced by attempting to determine whether 
or not petitioner's punishment was "enhanced" by reason of his 
failure to cooperate. The question for decision is whether that 
@-
failure is relevant to the goals of sentencing as currently 
understood. /\ 
2/ Ancient traditions support the policy favoring such 
~ - activity. "Historically, the common law recognized a duty "to 
~,.,.v f !h raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the authorities." 
' 
(;¥V ~ Branzburg v. 
t.,,v-~ 





'7 ii The District Court found that petitioner 
voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 





lfp/ss 2/18/80 Rider A, fn t (Roberts) 
We do note that Circuit Judge MacKinnon, author of 
the opinion reversing petitioner's first 
conviction, stated - on the basis of his "complete 
familiarity with the facts of this entire case" -
that the record does not support the assertion that 
petitioner obtained an "enhanced sentence" for his 
failure to cooperate. The sentence of two to eight 
~ 
years' imprisonment was not a severe one for a 
I\ 
"substantial drug distributor", engaging in that 
criminal conduct while on parole from a prior 
conviction for bank robbery. Indeed, as Judge 
MacKinnon observed, the sentence can be viewed as 
"a very light" one. Separate statement by Judge 
MacKinnon upon denial of rehearing en bane, pet. 
app. 21a. 





conspiracy. See App. 16 n. 4. His guilty plea was itself a 
waiver of Fifth Amendment rights as to the charges subject to 
the plea. ~, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 
21 Merely invoking the privilege would not have 
incriminated the petitioner. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 
648, 659 n. 13 (1976); see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 
39 (1968). Nor is it necessarily true that the majority of 
confessed felons will further incriminate themselves simply by 
revealing the names of their associates. Garner, at 659-661; 
see Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971). And no 
penalty or disadvantage of any kind attended reliance on the 
privilege in this case. Garner, at 661; see Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
~/ Bordenkircher v. Hayes 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978), 
quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) 
( Opinion of BRENNAN, J. ). 
~ ~ 
- er/2/21/80 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: No. 78-1793 Roberts 
I thought I would explain a few changes I have made in 
the draft. First, I have written a paragraph generally emphasizing 
the citizen's duty to cooperate, and noting that the duty also 
applies to the criminal defendant. As it seemed to flow quite 
naturally with the discussion in Part II, I have put it in text. 
However, it could of course be returned to the footnotes, thereby 
e shortening the text by nearly a page. 
-
Second, I did not put an explicit conclusion as to 
relevance at the end of Part II, because the petitioner does 
contest relevance. At pp. 12 and 17-18 his Brief, he asserts -
inartfully - that because he feared retaliation it was not rational 
to infer that his refusal to cooperate showed a "dimming of his 
prospects of rehabilitation." At pp. 13-16, he also cites and 
quotes from cases that have questioned relevance on this ground. 
Therefore, I thought it necessary to respond, however briefly, to 
this argument in Part III, which now deals with all of the 
petitioner's challenges to the sentencing theory presented in Part 
II (page 8-9). The ultimate conclusion that this petitioner's 





until this argument has been disposed of. I do think that the 
conclusion remains clear in the reorganized draft. 
2. 
Third, the rule that the privilege must be claimed is 
subject to a number of exceptions, which you discussed at some 
length in you opinion for the Court in Garner v. United States. To 
prevent any misunderstanding from the language on page 9, I have 
added a few phrases and a footnote pointing out what the exceptions 
are and noting that they are inapplicable to this case. 
.. 
er 2/21/80 
No. 78-1793 Roberts v. United States 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly 
considered, as one factor in imposinq sentence, the petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with officials investiqatinq a heroin . 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
The petitioner, Winfield Roberts, accompanied Cecilia 
Payne to the office of the United States Attorney for the 
District of Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government 
surveillance previously had revealed that a qreen Jaquar owned 
by Payne was used to transport heroin in the District. She toln 
investiqators that she occasionally lent the Jaquar to 
petitioner, who was waitinq outside in the hall. At Payne's 
suqqestion, the prosecutor asked petitioner if he would answer 
some questions. Althouqh petitioner was voluntarily present, he 
was qiven the warninqs required by Miranda · v. -Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966). He also was told that he was free to leave. When 
petitioner indicated that he would stay, the prosecutor asked 
whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, the principal tarqet of the 
heroin investiqation at that time. Petitioner admitted that he 
had delivered heroin to Thornton on several occasions. 
2. 
cJM, 
Confessinq that he had discussed druq transactions with Thornton 
~ 
in certain intercepted telephone conversations, petitioner 
explained the meaning of code words used in the conversations. 
When asked to name suppliers, however, he qave evasive answers. 
Althouqh the prosecutor warned petitioner that the extent of his 
cooperation would determine the charqes brouqht aqainst him, he 
provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspirinq to 
distribute heroin, 21 u.s.c. § 841, 846, and four counts of 
usinq a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 
u.s.c. § 843(b).l/ He retained a lawyer, who reiected the 
prosecutor's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's 
assistance. In March, 1976, petitioner entered a plea of quilty 
to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 
years' imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 
fine. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the qround 
that the terms of the plea aqreement were not disclosed fully to 
the District Court. Hnited - States - v: · Roberts, 570 F.2d 999 (CADC 
197 7) • 
On remand, petitioner pled quilty to two counts of 
telephone misuse under an aqreement permittinq the qovernment to 
allocute for a substantial sentence. The prosecutor filed a 
memorandum recommending consecutive sentences of 16 to 48 months 
3. 
on each count and a$ 5,000 fine.!/ After summarizing 
petitioner's record, which included a previous conviction for 10 
counts of bank robbery as well as his voluntary confession and 
his refusal to name suppliers, the memorandum emphasized the 
tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no family 
responsibilities, the government theorized that he sold heroin 
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and on 
parole. The memorandum concluded that stern treatment was 
required to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for 
personal profit. 
At the sentencinq hearinq, defense counsel noted that 
petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pendinq appeal, 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. 
Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent 
sentences that would result in his immediate release. He 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaininq that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved 
in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the request for 
probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's refusal to 
cooperate in the investigation over the course of "many, manv 
years, knowinq what he faces." Id., at 36. Thus, the qovernment 
4. 
was "not in a position [to ask the sentencinq iudqe] to take 
into account some extenuatinq and mitigating circumstances, that 
the defendant has cooperated •••• " Ibid. Stressinq the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or 
mitiqation, the qovernment recommended a substantial prison 
term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of 
one to four years on each count and a special parole term of 
three years, but declined to impose a fine. The Court listed 
three factors that had influenced the sentence: (i) Petitioner 
was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
offense; (ii) he was a dealer; and (iii) he failed to cooperate 
with the government.ii Petitioner aqain appealed, contendinq for 
the first time that the sentencinq court's consideration of his 
failure to cooperate was improper. The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but 
otherwise affirmed the iudqment. We granted certiorari, 
u. s. , and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles qoverning criminal sentencinq in the 
United States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. 
Congress has directed that 
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerninq the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 
which a court of the United States may receive and 
consider for the purpose of imposinq an 
appropriate sentence." 18 u.s.c. § 3577. 
5. 
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of 
the modern concept of individualized punishment that "fit[s] the 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams -v; · New · York 337 
u.s. 241, 247 (1949): see United · States · v; · Gravson, 438 U.S. 41, 
45-50 (1978). Two terms aqo we reaffirmed the "fundamental 
sentencinq principle" that "'a iudqe may appropriately conduct 
an inquiry broad in scope, larqely unlimited either as to the 
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it 
may come.~" Hnited -~tates - v; · Gravson, supra, at 50, quotinq 
6nited ·States - v; · Tacker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See also 
Pennsylvania -v; -Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, 
sustained due process obiections to sentences imposed on the 
basis of "misinformation of constitutional maqnitude." United 
States -v; -Tacker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972): see Townsend v; 
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741 (1948). 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
sentencing court relied upon facts that are essentially 
undisputed. There is no question that petitioner refused 
repeated requests for his cooperation over a period of three 
years. Nor does petitioner contend that he could not have 
6. 
provided the requested assistance had he desired to do so. 
Moreover, petitioner concedes that cooperation with the 
authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
connection to a defendant's willinqness to shape up and chanqe 
his behavior." Petitioner's Brief 17.4/ Unless otherwise 
explained, a defendant's refusal to assist in the investiqation 
of onqoinq crimes qives rise to an inference that these laudable 
attitudes are lackinq. 
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime 
has been condemned throuqhout our history. A citizen's dutv to 
"raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the 
authorities," Branzburq · v; · Haves, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972), was 
established at common law at least as early as the thirteenth 
century. See Statute of Westminster First, 3 F.dw. 1, c. 9 p. 43 
(1275): Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, c. 6 PP. 114-
115 (1285). The first Conqress of the United States enacted a 
statute imposinq criminal penalties on anyone who, "havinq 
knowledqe of the actual commission of a felony ••• conceals 
and does not as soon as possible make known the same to [the 
appropriate] authority." 1 Stat. 113, S6.5/ Althouqh the term 
"misprision of felony" now has an archaic rinq, qross 
~ 
indifference to the duty to report obsenzQd criminal behavior 
. ,~~-:-~~~-remains.,..ui ,e JQCt .Q V 1,13 'f l,lRaAlIDO!JS coi::i Qi:i!P3JQR • 
~ L4.,/ 
~e deeply rooted social obliqationj are not 
A ~ 
diminished when the witness of crime himself is involved in 
illicit activities. Unless his silence is protected by the 
privileqe against self-incrimination, see Part III, infra, the 
~ 
7. 
criminal defendant no less than anyAcitizen is obliqed to assist 
the authorities when called upon to do so. The petitioner, for 
example, was asked to expose the purveyors of heroin in his 
community in exchanqe for a favorable disposition of his case. 
In,\ ~e-~~~. oeti ti oner,(. ~l.:ftl>':;"'-
!1 ~ 
"obliqationfl of community life" that 
I\ 
1'H:ffiot be recoqnized before 
1 
rehabilitation can beqin, see Hart, The - Aims · of · the - Criminal 
ffe-~ 
Law, 32 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 ( 1 958J ~ oreserved his 
ability to resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts 
available to a sentencinq judqe are more relevant to the 
"'likelihood that [a defendant] will transqress no more, the 
hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist 
with a lawful future career, [and] the deqree to which he does 
or does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United 
States · v; · Grayson, supra, at 51, quotinq United · States - v; 
Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974). 
III 
Petitioner does not seriously challenqe the conclusion 




is relevant to the determination of an 
t\ 
Jk ~~ 
appropriate sentence. B11t petitione-£ contends that his 
/\ -\ T 
refusal to cooperate was justified by legitimate a-nd;r--
O<ot€rpe~iR~ fears of physical retaliation and J::' self-
incrimination. He asserts that the disclosures souqht by the 
government would have implicated him in numerous additional 
crimes. He also claims that his own safety and that of his 
family would have been endanqered if he had acted as an 
~ ~,(~ ~, 
informer. fetitioner concludes that his refusal --t.o- ~rat~ 
" ~ 
8. 
mQt.ivated a•9 tJ+e~~6'fl,,gOl?A"\ had "zero bearinq" on his prospect s 
for rehabilitation. Petitioner's Brief 18. In addition, he 
contends that "the district court erroneously punished [him] for 
exercisinq his Fifth Amendment riqht aqainst self-
incrimination." Petitioner's Brief 8. 
These arquments would have merited serious 
consideration if thev had been presented properly to the 
die,.. ~~ 
sentencinq iudqe. But the mere possibility S 
~ 
excuse~for antisocial conduct doj: not make that conduct 
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The District Court in 
this case had no opportunity to consider the theories now 
advanced by the petitioner, for each was raised for the first 
time in petitioner's brief on appeal. Althouqh petitioner was 
warned that his intransiqency would be used aqainst him, neither 
~ 




he nor his lawyer offered any explanation to the sentencinq 
court. Even after the prosecutor observed that the failure to 
cooperate could be viewed as evidence of continued criminal 
intent, petitioner remained silent. 
Petitioner insists, nevertheless, that he had a 
constitutional riqht to remain silent, and that no adverse 
inferences could be drawn from the exercise of that riqht. He~ 
I 
reasons that the Miranda warninqs qiven at his first encounter 
with the prosecutor advised him that he was entitled to remain 
silent. Althouqh he then voluntarily confessed to the offense 
for which he was later indicted,~/ he arques that he relied on 
the right to remain silent in refusinq to identify his suppliers 
of heroin or to testify aqainst his co-conspirato~ 
We find this arqument singularly unpersuasive. The 
Fifth Amendment privileqe aqainst comoelled self-incrimination 
is not self-executing. At least where the qovernment has no 
substantial reason to believe that the requested disclosures may 
be incriminatinq, the privileqe may not be relied upon unless it 
is invoked in a timely fashion. Garner v; · United ·States, 424 
U.S. 648, 653-655 (1976); United · States ·· v; · Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 
7-10 (1970); see United States · v. · Mandujano, 425 U.S. 504, 574-
575 (1976); Id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., concurrinq in the 




Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927), petitioner "did not 
assert his privileqe or in any manner suqqest that he withheld 
his testimony because there was any qround for fear of self-
incrimination. His assertion of it here is evidently an 
afterthouqht." The Court added in Vaitauer that the Privileqe 
"must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brouqht to 
the attention of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Id. 
Thus, if petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was 
privileqed, he should have invoked it at a time when the 
sentencinq court could have determined whether there was a 
leqitimate basis for relyinq upon the Fifth Amendment.8/ 
Petitioner seeks to avoid the force of the rule that 
the Fifth Amendment privileqe must be claimed by arquinq that he 
was given Miranda warninqs quaranteeinq to him the riqht to 
remain silent. But the riqht to silence described in those 





Althouqh Miranda's requirement of specific warninqs creates 
a limited exception to the rule that the privileqe must be 
claimed, the exception is qrounded on the inherently coercive 
nature of custodial interrogation. The warninqs were desiqned 
to protect persons who were exposed to such interroqation 
without the assistance of counsel, and thus were denied the 
ability to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. 
? 
11. 
Miranda -v. -Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476 (1966)~ see 6arner -v; 
linited ·States, supra, at 657.9/ 
There was no custodial interroqation in this case. 
Petitioner's confession was volunteered at his first interview 
with the prosecutor in 1975, after Miranda warninqs had been 
given and at a time when he was free to leave. He makes no 
claim that it was coerced. Thereafter, he was represented by 
counsel who was fully apprised - as was petitioner - that the 
extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to affect 
his sentence. The sentence challenqed in this case was not 
imposed until April 21, 1978. Durinq this entire period, neither 
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's 
unwillinqness to provide information vital to law enforcement 
was based on the eerrs-t)!~4orral riqht to remain silent or upon 
any fear of self-incrimination. Petitioner has identifiea no 
circumstance that miqht have impaired his "'free choice to 
admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'" 6arner -v; - United 
States, 657, quotinq Lisenba -v; · California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 
(1941). Nor was his conduct so "insolubly ambiquous" as to make 
the District Court's reliance upon it "fundamentally unfair." 
Cf. Doyle - v; - Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976).10/ Accordinqly, 
the judqment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
FOOTNOTES 
l/ On the basis of his intercepted conversations with 
Thornton, petitioner apparently could have been indicted for 13 
counts of unlawful use of the telephone. App. 36. 
!/ The maximum sentence on each count was four years' 
imprisonment and a$ 30,000 fine. 21 u.s.c. S 843(c). The 
prosecutor conceded that the usual practice in the District 
Court was to impose concurrent sentences for multiple uses of 
the telephone to distribute heroin. But the qoverninq statute 
explicitly provides that "each separate use of [the telephonel 
shall be a separate offense ••• " 21 u.s.c. S 843( b). Since 
the statute clearly authorizes separate punishment, consecutive 
sentences are permissible in appropriate cases. 
ll Before imposinq sentence, the court explained: 
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very 
carefully. We have noted aqain vou were on parole 
from a bank robbery conviction, which you have han 
prior involvement with the law. In this case you 
were clearly a dealer, but vou had an opportunitv 
to cooperate with the Government." App. 40. 
!/ See, e.q., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Standards - Relatinq · to - Pleas · of · Guiltv S 
1.8(a)(v) (Approved Draft, 1968); id;, at 48-49; Lumbard, --
Sentencing · and · Law - Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 413 (1965); cf. 
FN2. 
R. Cross, The · Enqlish · Sentencinq · Svstem 170 (1975). We doubt 
that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancinq 
the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner and denyinq him the 
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. 
The question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure 
to cooperate is relevant to the qoals of sentencinq as currently 
understood. We do note, however, that Circuit Judqe MacKinnon, 
author of the opinion reversinq petitioner's first conviction, 
observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity with the 
facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's sentence was a 
"very liqht" one. Separate Statement by Judqe MacKinnon upon 
denial of rehearing en ~banc, Pet. App. 21a. The sentence of two 
to eiqht years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe one for 
a "substantial druq distributor," l.9_., who plied his trade while 
on parole ffo a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
2/ As amended, 35 Stat. 1114, ~ 146, 62 Stat. 684, 
the statute is still in effect. 18 u.s.c. §4. It has been 
construed to require "both knowledqe of a crime and some 
affirmative act of concealment or participation." See Branzbarq 
v; · Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972). 
ii The District Court found that petitioner freelv 
waived his riqhts under Miranda - v; ·Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 





ll The Court recognized in Garner - v. · United · States, 
424 U.S. 648, 659-661 (1976), that the rule is subiect to 
exception when some coercive factor prevents an individual from 
claiming the privilege or impaired his ability to choose to 
remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case. 
Seep. , infra. 
~/ See Garner · v; - United - States, supra, at 658 n. 11; 
Hoffman v; · United · States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951 ); Mason · v. 
United -States 344 U.S. 362, 364-366 (1917); United ·States - v ; 
Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 1970), cert; · denied, 402 U.S. 
911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to determine the 
legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. 
Roqers - v; · United -States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-375 (1951). The 
privilege may not be employed as a tactic to shield a person 
from giving testimony he simply would prefer not to qive. 
!/ In United · States · v; -Washinqton, 431 U.S. 181, 187 
n. 5 (1977), the Court explained that: 
"All Miranda's safeguards, which are desiqned to 
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the 
overbearing compulsion which the Court thouqht was 
caused by isolation of a suspect in police 
custody." 
10/ We perceive no unfairness that would require an 
exercise of our supervisory power over federal court procedure. 
FN4. 
The District Court did not "participate" in Plea barqaininq 
discussions in violation of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e) (1). Nor 
did it announce any policy of differential sentencinq for those 
who cooperate and those who do not. And the recora shows no 
sign of collusion - apparent or real - between court and 
prosecution. To invalidate this sentence would be an 
unprecedented interference with the sentencinq function 
traditionally vested exclusively in the trial courts. See 
Dorszynski · v. · United · S1tates, 418 U.S. 424, 440-441 (1974). 
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No. 78-1793 Roberts v. United States 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly 
cons~dered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
art...,..t~a.l 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating 
a ht°:! 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
o/ g etition~ Winfield Rober ~ accompanied Cecilia 
Payne to the office of the United States Attorney for the 
District of Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government 
surveillance previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned 
t.Art·+t...-
b y Payne was used to transport heroin Lin the District. 
investigators t hat she occasionally lent the Jaguar to 
/'~--e_ 'ft told 
petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's 
i,-,vc.st,"_:J =~ 
suggestion, the pror3 e u ~ asked petitioner if he would answer 
some questions. Although petitioner was ( voluntaril~~ 7 
-fLe,_. i.,,.wz.s f, J a-1-rrrs 9 a~ l....·-. waszgi7 the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
---r,.._---, /-·._ 
436 (1966). t also w-a_t toldf that he was free to leave. When 
petitioner indicated that he would stay, the prosecutor asked 
+1........-. 
whether he knew "Boo" Thornton,Lthe principal target of the 
heroin investigationj a:r.,.... tMt t ime Petitioner admitted that he 




Confessing also that he had discussed drug transactions with 
Thornton in certain intercepted telephone conversations, 
petitioner explained the meaning of code words used in the 
JOll-fi-h'""""'"-r 
conversations. When asked to name suppliers, however, ~Lgave 
;.-,vut:,~ :;;a.~ 
evasive answers. Although the ~ro9icut7 warned petitioner that 
~ O"'-" 
the extent of his cooperation would d~t,rmin, the charges 
brought against him, he provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to 
distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841, 846, and four counts of 
using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b).l/ He retained a lawyer, who rejected the 
~~~._-t~ pr-osett7 continued efforts to enlist petitioner's 
assistance. In March, 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty 
to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 
years' imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 
fine. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
j,,.a,d_e.q~eLtef 7 
that the terms of the plea agreement were "7/ disclosed ~ to 
tU (,,A.. s. ,,,,,.,.,,_ .. 1>- c.. 4'o ) 
the District Court. United States v. Roberts J 570 F.2d 999 ~ 
c 977). 
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of 
-/L;,'f:" - r..R 
telephone misuse under an agreementL permittr the ~ vernment 
2,,___-f Se.~ 
allf ute ':7 a substantial sentence. The prosr:3 ~t°.t filed a 
-C.--.rt7 
to 
memorandum recommending, consecutive sentences of 16 to 48 months 
~ 
3. 
0-n rArh f"Anni. and a $ 5,000 fine.~/ After swnmo r j ~ 
-rt...... ,_...,__,.,....;;i.,.-ur~., .._ cil;-o..Q 
t<?e.+: ./,cr-,,..ta.h 
t · l ue.~ ·t· er's record, whic' i ne pet1 10n previous conviction for 10 
counts of bank robbery) ao He l l :::.r his voluntary confession) and l..:s 
-J a(se, 
subsequent refusal to name supplier'-' J he memorandumL emphasized 
the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
-ia.{ 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no famill_ 1.,,,/,/ 
responsibilities, the government theorized that he sold heroin 
a 
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and on 
~~'"'"""--.......t" a..-_, ...... ~ S.a......-t-e.-c..e.~ ~E... 
parole. The memo:r:~ oRglwJed that stern trea~ nt ~ 
required to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for 
personal profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that 
petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appe ~ 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. 
Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent 
~ .... sa.J 
sentences that would result in his immediate release. L 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved 
in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the request for 
probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's refusal to 
cooperate in the investigation over the course of "many, many 
years, knowing what he faces." Id., at 36. Thus, the government - -...... 
✓ 
L:.e>t.;t. I~ v, or 
was "not in a 
c..-rf:- ~ 
positioR7 ask the sen!_eneing ju~ to take 
4. 
into account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that 
the defendant has cooperated ...• " Ibid. Stressing the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or 
mitigation, the government recommended a substantial prison 
: 
term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of 
one to four years on each count and a special parole term of 
if: 
three years, butl declined to impose a fine. The Court !is::f' 
Q..,,cJ14lai.,,..,a,,,p, +1-..t ,c ~ i ....... ;4-l'"Sa.;;i a s a..v~ .s-·tc:a.......,e. ci.. ~a.c.o?"""*e... 
~aree factors eha~ad- infl~9R~ed-hll.c-sentefiCe--:--- +-kJ Petitioner 
was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
-s1 } . J J..ad re.ts~ 
offenslf 7 he was a dealer1' and ✓ heL~t l1' to cooperate 
with the government.3/ Petitioner again appealed, contending for = -
.sl,.,..-./JJ,. ,,..~ t....oJ ve. ce-f, '""?~ 
the first time that the sentencing court) eensidtatio~ his 
failure to cooperat ,:}__ w•• imp•m7 The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but 
~ t,,<. .S. Al?'- t). ~ . _ J £ot> F;.;:z. A S'I .F (1~79). 
otherwise affirmed the judgment j We granted certiorari, 111{ 
/ (tet tj.), 
J U.S.---} and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the 
United States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. 
Congress has directed that 
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 
which a court of the United States may receive and 
consider for the purpose of imposing an 
appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3577. 
5. 
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of 
-ie,,,t,.. ,!I,._;,./= "'-1-1-..e...... 
the modern conceptt 0£ i hdio id uali ~ 
st...-.td. 
punishment ~ 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New YorJ337 
U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 
45-50 (1978). Two §.erms agi we reaffirmed the "fundamental 
) . 
sentencing principle" that "'a judge may appropriately conduct 
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the 
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it 
may come.'" United States v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See also 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, 
sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the 
basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United 
SLA.e-a .... > s.t-
States v. Tucker, 404 1 S 
~ 447}~ 
see Townsend v. 
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741 (1948). 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
sentencing court relied upon fac t s that ,7 essentially 
~~fs~ re~~.ffe-e.. 
undispute i There is no question that petitioner[refusedJ 
repeated requests for his cooperation over a pe r iod of three 
years. Nor does petitioner contend that he c ould Rot ha~ 
6. 
~ 1,4...,.-alr;,I" -l- ~) L provi~ the requested assistanc1~flt-tawd~ AR-ee~ el-4ie~s;;;..i..i~r.Qea-t...a do SO"'! I~£2. . 
Mn~~o wA~ J petitioner concedes that cooperation with the 
authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change 
d a.,e.t -A-
his behavior)." L Petit ioner'-:!il ~ 17. _!/ Unless otherwise 
explained, a defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation 
of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that these laudable 
attitudes are lacking. 
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime 
has been condemned throughout our history. A citizen's duty to 
"raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the 
authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972), was 
established at common law at least as early as the thirteenth / 
- ..., ~ 1 7 > ,/ C /. J C ;- \ 6" ~ 
century. See Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, c. 9 p. 43 
(1275); Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, c. 6 pp. 114-
115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States enacted a 
¥-
statute imposing criminal penal ties f n anyone who, "having 
r:=-~-1u '°':;-7 .s t.s11 
knowledge of the actual commission of,JLfelo 't.7--:ZLconceal,;;--
""""a-, ~ ._ tf./"~c../M.._ o1..""'d. 
appropriate] 
and ~ not as soon as ~st~ make known the same to [the 
' J Ad of AJ,,-r- 3~,, I&!/ 7t)J c...l... • Clf; § G; J 
" ( 1 Stat. 11 3)_ ~ 2/ Al though the term 
"misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross 
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior 
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship. 
7. 
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished 
fr:; 
when the witness t crime himself is involved in illicit 
activities. Unless his silence is protected by the privilege 
against self-incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal 
defendantL no less than any other citizen~ obli~ to assist 





example, was asked to expose the purveyors of heroin in his ~ 
community in exchange for a favorable disposition of his case. 
<3'1 
~ declining to cooperate, petitioner rejected an "obligatio[n] 
of community life" that should be recognized before 
Criminal rehabilitation can begin/4 ~ee Hart, The Aims of the 
.:i.3 ,41.:l:tl i~<...r 
Law, 3/:Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 (1958) . 
,--.{ls:-l -h> c. ~c2..-f: 
1.so preserved 
his ability to resume criminal activities upon release. Few 
~ 
facts available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to the 
~ elihood that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the 
hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist 
with a lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does 
or does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United 
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v. 
Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974). 
III 
Petitioner does not seriously on c 1 us i OJ'l .. 
4 




investigation ustta~ is t_elevant to the determination of an ----
appropriate sentence. HeL contends that his refusal to 
cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical 
retaliation [ 
,4...-k,l-,·~.r 
and self-incrimination. t asserts that the 
disclosures sought by the ~vernment would have implicated him -
in numerous additional crimes. He also claims that his life 
would have been in danger if he had acted as an inform0 In 
e,-~< '? 
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal ..../-r; c~at"'e._ 
-$ ""~ 0.. 
prospects for rehabilitation. hat ~ bearing rf"' on his 
Petitioner's Brief~ In additiQn, 
also c.o--,c..( ~ dti'-$ £: 
~e ~ontfi(nds that the 
district court e~:rgoeD~ punished 
~ a 
hi~ or exercising his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. ·~7 
These arguments would have merited serious 
consideration if they had been presented properly to the 
sentencing judge. But the mere possibility of unarticulated 
explanations or excuses for antisocial conduct does not make 
that conduct irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The 
District Court ifi thi~ ~ had no opportunity to consider the 
-11,..a.t:. ~~~-f,~ 
theorie j(now advanceif'w, the ...,~i•isRo£, for each was raised for 
) 1/l""'.111:,re 
the first time in petitioner' sL brief an--apf}e-al~ Al though 
*~~ . 
petitioner . ":7 wa't war that his intransigency would be used 
against him, neither he nor his lawyer offered any explanation 
9. 
to the sentencing court. Even after the prosecutor observed 
that the failure to cooperate could be viewed as evidence of 
criminal intent, petitioner remained silent. 
Petitioner insists, neve rthe~7 that he had a 
silent fand that no adverse constitutional right to remain 
Co2"'-
inferences r be drawn from the exercise of that right. We 
find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not self-
executing. At least where the government has no substantial 
reason to believe that the requested disclosures may be 
incriminating, the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is 
invoked in a timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 
648, 653-655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 
(1970); see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 
-C-
5! 4, 574-575 
{17)4;.,,.,~ rf .-<:S:_.,-,..-, C. ?) j 
(1976 ~p., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the 
judgment) . ~/ 
- ,u,~-
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Comf ;;f Immigration, 
273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927), petitioner "did not assert his 
privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his 
testimony because there was any ground for fear of self-
incrimination. His assertion of it here is evidently an 
afterthought." The Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege 
"must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brought to 




Thus, if petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was 
.s&,'6L- 5o 
p rivileged, he should have iRvto~ at a time when the 
sentencing court could have determined whether 
/,,..;s c./-;""-' ~s 
-t.hr.:i:;; e wo/ 
legitimatf bas i s Eor r e ~v i no uoon the P rlt h-Am~ z! 
. wow..<d 
Petitioner oet-7 
t h f> Fll t-tc h Am priv .i.-1~ 
./t..,s e.lAv- .., -r-;L, 
avoid the force of ~ rule ~· 
by arguing that 
~ 
was 7 Miranda warnings quarantee YAe t9 him the right to 
remain silent. But the right to silence described in those 
-s 
warnings , derive! from the Fifth Amendment and adds not~ ng to 
it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates 
a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be 
r -? 
doe., "'1L>~ ¥14'-7 (7'-4.-1,itP• f/,..,e,_ e.~-t.a.-..4: o/ ~ 
claimed, the exception is ~rou;::o g as eAe inherently coercive 
-s A ~ ,-c.1-... ,· t: s • 
nature of custodial interrogationj The warnings 
~ protect persons who,7 e xposed to such interrogation 
1::.-t:l---.r ....ri ,;.._ ,,,,.,,. ,;1,,,. e ~ 1,,(1,,'\. .a.."' e.. 
without the assistance of counsel, a-ne &hps-~ 90nied t ~ 
,ace ii i ~~ to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v. 
United States, supra, at 657.8 / 
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. 
t..:. C,./?w,./J, .,, ; er-,.. 
Petitioner's c o &fession- w-0~ volunteeredl..at his first interview 
with in 1975 , after Miranda warnings had been 
doe-., .,,.,o"t"' 




was coerced.~/ Thereafter, +rej_ was represented by 
counsel who was fully apprised - as was petitioner - that the 
extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to affect 
his sentence. 
/Je.../;ficn.,-.._ca...r c{,t[ i.,,..o f:: r~•ve.. -fl..e.. $---~c:...e.. 
'fhe seftt.ense cha] J eogt i o tbi s cas.e r,m_: n ~ -- -c-..J 
e.k-:i-ll~a.s 
~ until April :r 1978. During this entire period, 
neither petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's 
unwillingness to provide information vital to law enforcement 
~~- ~ 
was based e n the right to remain silent or upt 1 7 fear of 
self-incrimination. 
- -11-,.,,..~ 
Petitioner has identified ni circumst. 7 that might 
have impaired his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse 
to answer.'" Garner 
4,;z.'-1- IA, ,S,, J .-t' 
v. United · States,L 657, quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941). Nor was his conduct so 
~$i~s.../?·tr'-
"insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's r°!ie7 
~ 
it "fundamentally unfair." Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 
610, 617-618 (1976). We conclude that the District Court 
committed no constitutional error. To invalidate petitioner's 
sentence on the record before us would be an 
u, . .....,a,.,..ra""'t:~eil l:Hlprl eden:::t 
interference with a function traditionally vested exclusively in 
the trial courts. See Dor/zJirxnski v. United States 418 U.S. 424, 






ll en the basis of l~ intercepted conversations with 
~,,~,"t/J,,.,..). -fl.e__ ~ci2S,:S 
Thornton, :P8titioRe, apparently could have eeeo / edict~ for 13 
a. 
counts of unlawful use of -t-e telephone. App. 36. 
II The maximum sentence on each count was four years' 
r--- ---
imprisonment and a$ 30,000 fine. 21 u.s.c. § 843(c) / The 
~~~-a-t-
 conceded that the usual practice in the District 
Court was to impose concurrent sentences for multiple uses of 
the telephone to distribute heroin. But the governing statute 
explicitly provides that "ifach separate use of [the telephone] 
shall be a separate offense. - ~ 21 U.S.C. § 843( b). Since 
the statute clearly authorizes separate punishment, consecutive 
sentences are permissible in appropriate cases. 
II Before imposing sentence, the court explained: 
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very 
carefully. We have noted again you were on parole 
from a bank robbery conviction, which you have had 
prior involvement with the law. In this case you 
were clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity ~fuW 
to cooperate with the Government." App. 40. 
41 See, e.g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for 
- ---
t 
Criminal Justice, ~ tandards Relating to Pleas of Guilty§ 
1.8(a)(v) (Aph Draft, 1968): id., at 48-49: Lumbard, 
..Jf-14-





R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 (197 ~ d: ubt 
that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing 
the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. 
The qu~s~ion for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure 
t::1,1.u41o--tC.., ,.,__ ..,.."2,.,,sl-ot::,.,J ~ ) 
to cooperate is relevant to thel goals of sentencin~ ~-, 0 1.11;::r: e ~ 
under st~ We do note, however, that Ci re:t' Judge MacKinnon, 
author of the opinion reversing petitioner's first conviction, 
observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity with the 
facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's sentence was a 
u -;1-......., 51;,r,,~ "· r?oi,,.,,-t,<1 G~::e- 'iflF, fi'::<3 
"very 1 ight" one L (jeparate f tatement O MacKinnonf ltpon 
denial of rehearing en banc ff Pet. App. 21a~ The sentence of two 
to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalty 
::Jgi-
for a "substantial drug distributor," 1-·, who plied his trade 
while on parole from a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
3-5 St at . 11 14 . ~ 1-4 6 , 6-2-St:a t - 6 
~ he statutelis still in effect. 18 U.S.C. ~4. It has been 
construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some 
affirmative act of concealment or participation." See Branzburg 
~ - 3~ 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 69 t (1972). 
~/ The District Court found that petitioner freely 
waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
when he first confessed his involvement in the conspiracy. See 
App. 1 6 n. 4 . - - b ~:-f< 
FN3. 
21 The Court recognized in Garner v. United States, 
-is 
424 U.S. 648, 659-661 (1976), that thl rule is subject to 
exception when some coercive factor prevents an individual from 
-& 
claiming the privilege or impairet his ~ to 
remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case. 
Seep. , infra. 
~/ See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658 n. 11; 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. 
~-
United StatesJ l 44 U.S. 362, 364-366 (1917); United States v. 
Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 
911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to determine the 
legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. 
A 
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-375 (1951). n 
.,.,.. ~ 1;11,d; c--'-;4/r, --/Lr- avoid L privilege Hiay Rot b0 OHl~l~ a~ a tactie to -Sb-i"'-1..d-
-l"'a t-
e 
7 giving testimony/ he simply would prefer not to give. 
'"--1--c.s 
~/ In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n. 
5 (1977), the Court explained that 
,,1 Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to 
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the 
overbearing compulsion which the Court thought was 




No. 78-1793 Roberts v. United States 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly 
considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne 
to the office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance 
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne was 
used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told 
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to 
petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's 
suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would 
answer some questions. Although petitioner was present 
voluntarily, the investigators gave him the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). They also told him 
that he was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he 
would stay, the prosecutor asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, 
the principal target of the heroin investigation at that time. 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton on 
11. 
the sentence he now challenges until 1978. During this entire 
period, neither petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that 
petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law 
enforcement was based upon the right to remain silent or the 
fear of self-incrimination. 
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have 
impaired his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to 
answer.'" Garner v. United States, 424 U.S., at 657, quoting 
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941). Nor was his 
conduct so ''insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's 
consideration of it "fundamentally unfair." Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976). We conclude that the District 
/t l,e,1-4. ~ 
Court committed no constitutional error.j~ invalidate 
~ ~ 
petitioner's sentence on the record before us_,\would e(a'n 
unwarranted interference with a function traditionally vested 
e.KchH,,.i.r,elrr in the trial courts. See Dorszynski v. United 
States 418 U.S. 424, 440-441 (1974). Accordingly, the judgment 




No. 78-1793 Roberts v. United States 
1. 3113 
Ql-(/tM~V=- -, 
q MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly 
considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's . 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigatinq a criminal 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne 
to the office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia one day in June Qf 1975. Government surveillance 
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne was 
used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told 
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to 
petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's . 
suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would 
answer some questions. Althouqh petitioner was present 
voluntarily, the investigators gave him the warnings required by 
Miranda · v; ·Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). They also told him 
that he was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he 
would stay, the prosecutor asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, 
the principal target of the heroin investigation at that time. 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton on 
• 
2. 
several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed drug 
transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted telephone 
conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code words 
used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, 
however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although the 
investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his 
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he 
provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to 
distribute heroin, 21 u.s.c. § 841, 846, and four counts of 
using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 
U.S.C. § 843(b).II He retained a lawyer, who rejected the 
Government's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's 
assistance. In March ~ 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty 
to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 
years' imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 
fine. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately disclosed 
to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 U.S. App. 
D.C. 90, 570 F.2d 999 (1977J. 
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of 
telephone misuse under an agreement that permitted the 
Government to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed 
._ 
3. 
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 16 to 48 
months each and a$ 5,000 fine.2/ The memorandum summarized 
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank 
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent refusal to 
name suppliers. The memorandum also emphasized the tragic 
social consequences of the heroin trade. Since petitioner was 
not himself an addict and had no familial responsibilities, the 
Government theorized that he sold heroin to support his 
extravagant life style while unemployed and on parole. The 
Government concluded that stern sentences were necessary to 
deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal . 
profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that 
petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. 
Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent 
sentences that would result in his immediate release. He 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved 
in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the request for 
probation was "ironic" in liqht of petitioner's refusal to 
cooperate in the invest~gation over the course of "many, many 
4. 
years, knowing what he faces." Id., at 36 / Thus, the Government - \..-" 
could not ask the court "to take into account some extenuating 
and mitigating circumstances, that the defendant has cooperated 
" Ibid. Stressing the seriousness of the offense and 
the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended 
a substantial prison term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of 
one to four years on each count and a special parole term of 
three years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court 
explained that these sentences were appropriate because 
petitioner was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the 
time of the offenses, and because he was a dealer who had 
refused to cooperate with the Government.3/ Petitioner again 
appealed, contending for the first time that the sentencing 
court should not have considered his failure to cooperate. The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated 
the special ?arole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. 
U.S. App. D. C. , 600 F.2d 815 (1979). We granted 
certiorari, 440 U.S. (1979), and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the 
United States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. 
Congress has directed that 
~ 
3/''[n]o limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 
which a court of the United States may receive and 
consider for the purpose of imposing an 
appropriate sentence." 18 u.s.c. ~ 3577. 
5. 
~This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of 
the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York 337 
U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 
45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the "fundamental 
sentencing principle" that "'a judge may appropriately conduct 
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the 
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it 
may come.'" United States v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See also 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, 
sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the 
basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United 
States v. Tucker, supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 
736, 740-741 (1948). 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. 
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests 
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does 
6. 
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested 
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with 
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change 
.....--_ 
his behavior • 
C/ 
" Brief for Petitioner 17.4/ Unless 
otherwise explained, a defendant's refusal to assist in the 
investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that 
these laudable attitudes are lacking. 
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime 
has been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty 
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the 
authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972), was 
an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence at least as 
early as the thirteenth century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of 
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see 
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, J, 9
1
p. 43 (1275); 
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, ~. 1, 4, and 6? PP· 
112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States enacted 
a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone -who, "having 
knowledge of the actual commission of [certain felonies,] shall 
conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose a nd make known the 
r-, 
same to [the appropriate] authorit~l..: " Act of Apr. 30, 
1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 Stat. 113.5/ Although the -t erm "misprision 
7. 
of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross indifference to the 
duty to report known criminal behavior remains a badge of 
irresponsible citizenship. 
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished 
when the witness to crime himself is involved in illicit 
activities. Unless his silence is protected by the privilege 
against self-incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal 
defendant no less than any other citizen is obliged to assist 
the authorities. The petitioner, for example, was asked to 
expose the purveyors of heroin in his own community in exchange 
for a favorable disposition of his case. By declining to 
cooperate, petitioner rejected an "obligatiorn] of community 
life" that should be recognized before rehabilitation can begin. 
See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 
;2_ 
401, 437 (1958). Petitioner's refusal to cooperate also 
preserved his ability to resume criminal activities upon 
release. Few facts available to a sentencing judge are more 
relevant to "'the likelihood that [a defendant] will transgress 
no more, the hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts 
to assist with a lawful future career, [and] the degree to which 
he does or does not deem himself at war with his society.'" 
United States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v. 




Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard 
for the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is 
irrelevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He 
rather contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by 
legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. 
In view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal 
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for 
rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court 
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
These arguments would have merited serious 
consideration if they had been presented properly to the 
sentencing judge. But the mere possibility of unarticulated 
explanations or excuses for antisocial conduct does not make 
that conduct irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The 
District Court had no opportunity to consider the theories that 
petitioner now advances, for each was raised for the first time 
in petitioner's appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that 
his intransigency would be used against him, neither he nor his 
lawyer offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even 
after the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate 
could be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, 
9. 
petitioner remained silent. 
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right 
to remain silent, and that no adverse inferences can be drawn 
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument 
singularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least 
where the government has no substantial reason to believe that 
the requested disclosures may be incriminating, the privilege 
may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a timely fashion. 
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-655 (1976); United 
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); see United States v. 
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976) (Opinion of BURGER, 
C.J.); Id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the 
judgment).6/ 
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of 
Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927), petitioner "did not 
assert his privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld 
his testimony because there was any ground for fear of self-
incrimination. His assertion of it here is evidently an 
afterthought." The Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege 
"must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brought to 
the attention of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. 
Thus, if petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was 
.... 
1 0. 
privileged, he should have said so at a time when the sentencing 
court could hav.e determined whether his claim was legitimate.I_/ 
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary 
rule by arguing that Miranda warnings guaranteed him the right 
to remain silent. But the right to silence described in those 
warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to 
it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates 
a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be 
claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the 
inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was 
designed. The warnings protect persons who, exposed to such 
interrogation without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might 
be unable to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v. 
United States, supra, at 657.8/ 
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. 
Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview 
with investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been 
g iven and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not 
claim that he was coerced.9/ Thereafter, petitioner was 
represented by counsel who was fully apprised - as was 
petitioner - that the extent of petitioner's cooperation could 
be expected to affect his sentence. Petitioner did not r eceive 
11 • 
the sentence he now challenges until 1978. During this entire 
period, neither petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that 
petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law 
enforcement was based upon the right to remain silent or the 
fear of self-incrimination. 
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have 
impaired his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to 
answer.'" Garner - v; · United ·States, 424 U.S., at 657, quotinq 
I:.isenba · v; ·California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941). Nor was his 
conduct so "insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's 
consideration of it "fundamentally unfair." Cf. Doyle - v; ·Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976). We conclude that the District 
Court committed no constitutional error. If we were to 
invalidate petitioner's sentence on the record before us, we 
would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function 
traditionally vested in the trial courts. See Dorszynski · v~ 
United ·States 418 U.S. 424, 440-441 (1974). Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
FOOTNOTES 
~I Petitioner's intercepted conversations with 
Thornton apparently could have provided the basis for 13 counts 
of unlawful use of a telephone. App. 36. 
II The maximum sentence on each count was four years' 
imprisonment and a$ 30,000 fine. 21 U.S.C. § 843(c). 
ll Before imposing sentence, the court explained: 
4r" "Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very 
carefully. We have noted again you were on parole 
from a bank robbery conviction, which you have had 
prior involvement with the law. In this case you 
were clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity 
and failed to cooperate with the Government." 
App. 40. 
ii See, e.g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty~ 
1.8(a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968): id., at 48-49: Lumbard, Sentencing 
and Law Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 413-414 (1965): cf. R. 
Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 (1975). 
;:2__ 
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn 
between "enhancing the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner 
and denying him the "leniency" he claims would be appropriate if 
he had cooperated. The question for decision is simply whether 
petitioner's failure to cooperate is relevant to the currently 
understood goals of sentencing. We do note, however, that Judge 
.. 
FN2. 
MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing petitioner's first 
conviction, observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity 
with the facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's 
sentence was a "very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 
F.2d 815, 823 (1979). The sentence of two to eight years' 
impr isonment certainly was not a severe penalty for a 
"substantial drug distributor," ~~t~-, who plied his trade while 
on parole from a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
2/ The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 
U.S.C. §4. It has been construed to require "both knowledge of a 
crime and some affirmative act of concealment or participation." 
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 69~n. 36 (1972). 
ii The District Court found that petitioner freely 
waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
when he first confessed his involvement in the conspiracy. 
Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v. Roberts, No. 75-619, 
at 40 Oct. 17, 1975)~ see App. 161 n. 4. 
21 The Court recognized in Garner v. United States, 
424 U.S. 648, 659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to 
exception when some coercive factor prevents an individual from 
claiming the privilege or impairs his choice to remain silent. 
No such factor has been identified in this case. Seep. 
infra. 
FN3. 
~/ See Garner v. United States, supra, at 6581 n. 11; 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. 
United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364-366 (1917); United States v. 
Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 
:,;__ 
911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to determine the 
legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. 
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A witness 
may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he 
simply would prefer not to give. 
~/ In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n. 
5 (1977), the Court explained that "[a]ll Miranda's safeguards, 
which are designed to avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the 
overbearing compulsion which the Court thought was caused by 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 78-1793 
Winfield L. Roberts Petitioner l On Writ of Certiorari to the 
' ' v. United States Court of 
United States. Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. 
[March -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court, 
The question is whether the District Court properly con-
sidered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to 
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance 
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne 
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told 
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to peti-
tioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's sug-
gestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer 
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily, 
the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 1966) . They also told him that he 
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would 
stay, the prosecutor asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, 
the principal target of the heroin investigation at that time. 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton 
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed 
drug transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted tele-
2 
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code 
words used in the conversations. When asked to name sup-
pliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although 
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his 
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he 
provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to dis-
tribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 841, 846, and four counts of using 
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 U. S. C. 
§ 843 (b) .1 He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Govern-
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In 
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the con-
spiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years' 
imprisonment, three years' speciaJ parole, and a $5,000 fine . 
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately dis-
closed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977). 
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of tele-
phone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Govern-
ment to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed 
, a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. 2 The memorandum 
~ummarized cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts 
of bank robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent 
,refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also empha-
sized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial 
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin 
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and 
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences 
1 Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could 
.. have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone. 
App. 36. 
2 The maximum sentence on each count was four years' imprisonment 
and a $30,000 fine. 21 U.S. C. §843 (c). 
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs 
for personal profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that peti-
tioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to proba-
tion. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concur-
rent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that 
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the 
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's 
reful':al to cooperate in the investigation over the course of 
"many, many years, ·knowing what he faces." Id., at 36. 
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into 
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that 
the defendant has cooperated. . .. " Ibid. Stressing the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitiga-
tion, the Government recommended a substantial prison term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one 
to four years on each count and a special parole term of three 
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court expla.ined 
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was 
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to 
cooperate with the Government.3 Petitioner again appealed, 
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should 
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the spe-
cial parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. -
3 Before imposing sentence, the court explained: 
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have 
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which 
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were 
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with 
the Government." App. 40. 
4 
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U. S. App. D. C. -, 600 F. 2d 815 (1979). We granted 
certiorari, 440 U. S. - (1979), and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United 
States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Con-
gress has directed that 
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a 
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of impos-
ing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577. 
- This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy 
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New Yark, 
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the 
"fundamental sentencing principle" that "'a judge may 
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, fargely 
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may con-
sider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States 
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 
U. S. 443, 446 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process 
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinforma-
tion of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker, 
su7)ra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740-741 
(1948) . 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. 
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repea.ted requests 
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does 
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested 
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with 
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change 
78-1793-OPINION 
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his behavior .... " Brief for Petitioner 17.4 Unless otherwise 
explained, a defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation 
of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that these laudable 
attitudes are lacking. 
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has 
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty 
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the authori-
ties," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 ( 1972) , was an 
established tenet of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence at least as 
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of 
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522: see 
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275); 
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6, 
pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States 
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone 
who, "having knowledge of the act.ual commission of [ certain 
felonies ,] shall conceal , and not as soon as may be disclose and 
make known the same to [the appropriate] authority .... " 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113.5 Although the 
4 See, e. g , ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a ) (v ) (App. Draft, 1968); 
id., at 48-49 ; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F . R. D. 
406, 413-414 (1965) ; cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 
(1975). 
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhanc-
ing the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The 
question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is 
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note, 
however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing peti-
tioner 's first conviction , observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity 
with t he facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's sentence was a 
"very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F . 2d 815, 823 (1979). 
The sentence of two to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a 
severe penalty for a "substantial drug distributor," ibid , who plied his 
trade while on parole from a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
5 The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 U. S. C. § 4. It has 
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative 
6 
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross 
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior 
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship. 
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when 
the witness to crime himself is involved in illicit activities. 
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no 
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities. 
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors 
of heroin in his own community in exchange for a favorable 
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner 
rejected an "obligatio[n] of community life" that should be 
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 
(1958). Petitioner's refusal to cooperate also preserved his 
ability to resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts 
available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to" 'the like-
lihood that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope 
that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a 
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or 
does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United 
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v. 
Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974). 
III 
Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for 
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant 
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather 
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legiti-
mate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In 
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal· 
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for 
rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court 
act of concealment or participation." See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 
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punished him for exerc1smg his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
These arguments would have merited serious consideration 
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge. 
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or 
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct 
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The District Court had 
no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now 
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's 
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransi-
gency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer-
offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after 
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could 
be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner 
remained silent. 
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to 
remain silent, and that no adverse inferences can be drawn 
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument sin-
gularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least 
where the government has no substantial reason to believe 
that the requested disclosures may be incriminating, the privi-
lege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a timely 
fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653-655 
(1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); see 
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 574-575 (1976) 
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring in the judgment).6 
In this case, as in l1 ajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 
273 U. S. 103, 113 ( 1927) , petitioner "did not assert his privi-
lege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony 
l 
'} The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), when he first confessed his 
involvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v. 
Roberts, No. 75-619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4. 
8 
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because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination. 
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The 
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed 
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention 
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if 
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged, 
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court 
could ha.ve determined whether his claim was legitimate.7 
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by 
arguing that Miranda warnings guaranteed him the right to 
remain silent. But the right to silence described in those 
warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing 
to it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings 
creates a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must 
be claimed. the exception does not apply outside the context 
of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which 
it was designed. The warninQ"s protect persons who. exposed 
to such interrogation without the assistance of counsel. other-
wise might be unable to make a free and informed choice to 
remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 
(1966): see Garner v. Un1ted States, supra, at 657.8 
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Peti-
tioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with 
investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given 
~ The C<'urt recognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 
659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive 
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his 
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case. 
Seep.-, infra. 
":tsee Garner v. Unit ed States, supra, at 658, n . 11: Hoffman v. Unit ed 
States. 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v. United States. 244 U.S. 362, 
364-366 (1917); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 
1970), cert. denied . 402 U. S. 911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to 
determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amend-
ment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A wit-
ness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he 
simply would prefer not to give. 
78-1793-0PINION 
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES 9 
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim 
that he was coerced.9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented 
by counsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that 
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to 
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he 
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither 
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwill-
ingness to provide information vital to law enforcement 
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of 
self-incrimination. 
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired 
his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'" 
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941). Nor was his conduct 
so "insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's 
consideration of it "fundamentally unfair." Cf. Doyle v . 
Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617-618 (1976). We conclude that the 
District Court committed no constitutional error. If we were 
to invalidate petitioner's sentence on the record before us, we 
would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function 
traditionally vested in the trial courts. See Dorszynski v. 
. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441 ( 1974). Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
Srn United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), the 
Court explained that " [a]ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to 
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which 
the Court thought was caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody." 
,., " 
\ \I\ vQ.) hja0v'S 
~I~ 
~ -~f-ao 
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The question is whether the District Court properly con-
sidered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
refusiil to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
Pethioner ,vinfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Pay11e to 
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance 
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne 
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told 
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to peti-
tioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's sug-
gestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer 
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily, 
the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 1966). They also told him that he 
-
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would l} 
stay, the roseel:l:te:v,asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton,.,r- ~v-,. 
the prin~ al target of the heroin investigationtJtt th.ab time • .., 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton 
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed 
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code 
words used in the conversations. When asked to name sup-
pliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. . Although 
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his 
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he 
provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to dis-
tribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 841, 846, and four counts of using 
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin. 21 U. S. C. 
§ 843 (b).1 He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Govern-
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In 
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the con-
spiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years' 
imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine. 
· The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately dis-
closed to the District Co11rt. United States v. Roberts, 187 
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977). 
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of tele-
phone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Govern-
ment to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed 
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. 2 The memorandum 
1g;nmmriu,rel cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 co. unts"\ 
of bank robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subseque~_1:...J 
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also errfp}ia-
sized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial 
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin 
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and ~ 
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences/ 
1 Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could 
have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone. 
App. 36. 
2 The maximum sentence on each count was four years' imprisonment 
and a $30,000 fine. 21 U.S. C. § 843 (c). / 
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs 
for personal profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that peti-
tioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to proba-
tion. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concur-
rent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that 
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the 
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's 
refurnl to cooperate in the investigation over the course of 
"many, many years, knowing what he faces." Id., at 36. 
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into 
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that 
' the defendant has cooperated .... " Ibid. Stressing the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitiga-
tion, the Government recommended a substantial prison term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one 
to four years on each count and a special parole term of three 
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained 
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was 
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to 
cooperate with the Government.3 Petitioner again appealed, 
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should 
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the spe- / 
cial parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. - / 
3 Before imposing sentence, the court explained: 
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have 
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which 
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were 
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with / 
the Government." App. 40. ../ 
4 
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U. S. App. D. C. -, 600 F . 2d 815 (1979) . We granted 
certiorari, 440 U. S. - (1979), and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United 
States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Con-
gress has directed that 
"[n] o limitation shall be placed on the information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a 
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of impos-
ing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577. 
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy 
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York, 
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the 
. "fundamental sentencing principle" that "'a judge may 
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may con-
sider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States 
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 
U. S. 443, 446 ( 1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process 
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinforma-
tion of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker, 
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740-741 
(1948). 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. 
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests 
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does 
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested 
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with 
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
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~
behavior .... " Brief for Petitioner 17.
4 
Unless ~fit; ~ 
~pltl!tfie6y a defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation 12.>fpl~o\"\ 'S. 
ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that these laudable ~o v\.Cl.!J 
1tudes are lacking. ~ 
It hardly could be~ Concealment of crime has ~ 
been condemned throug~ history. The citizen's duty 
JJ 
"raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the authori-
es," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972), was an 
tablished tenet of Anglo-Saxon j~Fii;;Jyr1,,1,fan'1~ at least as 
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth , History of 
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see 
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275); 
Statute of Westminster Second. 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6, 
pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States 
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone 
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain 
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and 
make known the same to [the appropriate] authority .... " 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113.5 Although the-------
4 See, e. g, ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968); 
id., at 48-49; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F. R. D. 
406, 413-414 (1965); cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 
(1975). 
~ · . We doubt _that a ~rincipled distinction~~ ?~ dra~vn betw~en "e?hanc-
- mgJthe pumshment imposed upon th-e petitioner ancl denymg him the 
"lemency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The 
_g_ 
question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is 
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note, 
however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing peti-
---- --tiener '-8--£.FS-t-conviction, observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity 
---;ith the facts of this entire - c"ase'' that tliepetmoner's,Jsentence).~a 
"very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F. 2d 815, 823 (1979) 
The sentence of two to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not 
severe penalty for a "substantial drug distributor," ibid , who plied his 
trade while on parole from a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
·1,,l,.,;:il_,,cr--~•"!i The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 U. S. C. § 4. It has 
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross 
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior 
rema.ins a badge of irresponsible citizenship . 
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when 
the witness to crime(himself Jis involved in illicit activitie~ . 
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no 
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities. 
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors 
of heroin in his own community in exchange for a favorable 
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner 
rejected an "obligatio[n] of community life" that should be 
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The 
ims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 
(~ .Fetitioner's refusal to cooperate ~~pPes0F1.•e€l fiis 
ability to resume criminal activities upon relea e. Few facts 
available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to "'the like-
lihood that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope 
~ that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a 
7 
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or 
does not deem himself at war with his society.' " United 
. States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v. 
. Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974). 
III 
· Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for 
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant 
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather 
contends that his failure to· cooperate was justified by legiti-
mate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In 
rrotedect ki ~ 
fovM.tr 
ft'-(~({ ,· t1 
ChrM!l, ~bj 
pre~vvi~ 
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal ~ 
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for..,.........---
rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court 
act of concealment or participation." See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 
665, 696, n. 36 (1972). / ~ 
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puhished him for exerc1smg his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
These arguments would have merited serious consideration 
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge. 
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or 
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct 
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The District Court had 
no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now 
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's 
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransi-
gency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer 
offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after 
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could 
be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner 
remained silent. 
____ ...... ~ · "-·~on:,.::er insists that he had a constitutional right to 
remain silen and that no adverse inferences can be drawn 
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument sin-
gularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least 
where the government has no substantial reason to believe 
that the requested disclosures~natmg, £Fie privi-
lege may not be relied upon un!e'ss it is invoked in a timely 
fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653-655 
(1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); see 
-( a.re..-~\ kt j 
v..., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 574-575 (1976) 
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring in the judgment).6 
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, ,.. 
273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927) , petitioner "did not assert his privi-~ 
lege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony 
[ 
~ The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), when he first confessed his 
involvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v. 
Roberts, No. 75-619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4. 
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because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination. 
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The 
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed 
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention 
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if 
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged, 
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court 
could have determined whether his claim was legitimate.7 
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by 
arguing that Miranda warningsi guaPanteed ~ ight to 
remain silent . But the right o silence described in those 
warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing 
to it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings 
creates a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must 
be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context 
of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which 
it was designed. The warnings protect persons who, exposed 
to such interrogation without the assistance of counsel, other-
wise might be unable to make a free and informed choice to 
remain silent . . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 
6 IA.() p ft.e.d 
_ ...J • ' . " - ('/ ~,,::t /(.'~ 
(MJ~oh'm,, 
. {;y ~ 
L 
(1966); see Garner v. United States, supra, at 657.8 
~iere was no custodial interrogation in this case. Peti- ~ 
tioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with~ 
investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given 
'The Court recognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 
659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive 
factor prevents an individual from claiming t he pri vilege or impairs his~ 
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case. 
See p. - , infra . 
1 See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, n. 11: Hoffman v. United 
States. 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v. United States , 244 U. S. 362, 
364-366 (1917); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F . 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 
1970), cert. denied . 402 U. S. 911 (1971) . It is the duty of a court to 
determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon t he Fifth Amend-
ment. R ogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A wit-
ness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he 
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and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim 
that he was coerced.9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented 
by counsel who was fully apprised_:_as was petitioner-that 
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to 
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he 
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither 
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwill-
ingness to provide information vital to law enforcement 
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of 
self-incrimination. 
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired 
his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'" 
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941) . ~ ijis conduc ~~ M , 
se- "insolubly ambigtt(,ttS" as to make tbe Dietfiet Go ' ~\o~c.t ~ 
-e0~idBratimr uf n- ''fundammrmHy-mrfm~ Cf. Doyle V. l~, l/ll•\~Deub)l,\ 
Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617-618 (1976). We conclude that the t. ., ..J 
District Court committed no constitutional error. If we were Orv\ ~!34.,0(L~ 
to invalidate petitioner's sentence on the record before us, we post :~,t-- . 
would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function _ 't _ _ _ 'f-tto_.f'" 
traditionally vested in the trial courts. See Dorszynski v. 'SI\JlA/\U' 
United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441 (1974). Accordingly, I Ma~ klt? . ..,, iNl«cr J 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is \,., ¼.e...- ' · 
Affirmed. ;~ ,. 
~-Wua.{A((0 
8m United States v. Wa.shington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977) , the 
Court explained that "[a]ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to 
to vt.b;x. il\.e.J , n 
f¼w-~ 
~((),fl.~, 
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion t:~~~~ ~ -
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Winfield L. Roberts, Petitioner, lOn Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States.. Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. 
[March -, 1980] 
Ma. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly con• 
sidered, as one factor· in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to 
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance 
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne 
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told 
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to peti-
tioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's sug-
gestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he WOllld answer 
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily, 
the investiga.tors gave him the warnings required by 1vliranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). They also told him that he 
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would 
stay, the investigtors asked whether he knew "Boo" Thorn-
ton, then the principal target of the heroin investigation. 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton 
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed 
drug transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted tele-
2 
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code 
words used in the conversations. When asked to name sup-
pliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although 
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his 
coopera.tion would bear on the charges brought against him, he 
provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to dis-
tribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 841, ·s46, and four counts of using 
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin , 21 U. S. C. 
§ 843 (b).1 He retained a ·1awyer, who rejected the Govern-
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In 
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the con-
spiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years' 
imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
that the terms of the plea agreem~nt were inadequately dis-
closed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 
U. S. App. D. C. 90. 570 F. 2d 999 (1977) . 
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of tele-
phone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Govern-
ment to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed 
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine .2 The memorandum 
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank 
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent 
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also empha-
sized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial 
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin 
to support his extravagant l ife style while unemployed and 
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences 
1 Petit ioner's intercepted conversation:,; with Thornton apparently could 
l1ave provided the basis fo r 13 counts pf unlawful use of a telephone. 
App. 36. 
2 The maximum sentence on each count was four ye-,us' imprisomne1rt 
and a $30,000 fine. 21 U. S. C. ~ 843 (c). 
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drqgs 
for personal profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that peti-
tioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to proba-
tion. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concur-
rent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that 
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the 
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of 
"many, many years, knowing what he faces." Id., at 36. 
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into 
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that 
the defendant has cooperated. . . ." Ibid. Stressing the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitiga-
tion, the Government recommended a substantial prison term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one 
to four years on each count and a special parole term of three 
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained 
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was 
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to 
cooperate with the Government.8 Petitioner again appealed, 
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should 
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the spe-
cial parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. -
3 Before imposing sentence, the court explained: 
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have 
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which 
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were 
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with 
the Government." App. 40. 
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U. S. App. D. C. -, 600 F: 2d 815 (1979), We granteq 
pertiorari, 440 U. S. - ( 1979) , and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United 
$tates District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Con-
gress has directed that 
" [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information con .. 
cerning the background, character, and conduct of 9,, 
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of impos-
ing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577. 
;rhis Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy 
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York, 
337 U. S. 241, 247 ( 1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 
U. S. 41 , 45--50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the 
"fundamental sentencing principle" tha,t " 'a judge may 
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited either as to th~ kind of information he may con-
sider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States 
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 
U. S. 443, 446 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process 
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinforma.; 
tion of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker, 
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741 
(1948). 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
!3entencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. 
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests 
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does 
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested 
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with 
:the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
cohheciioi1 to a defendant's willinghess to shape up anthhahge 
78-1793-0PINION 
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his behavior .... " Brief for Petitioner 17.4 Unless a differ-
ent explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in 
the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference 
that these laudable attitudes are lacking. 
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has 
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty 
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the 
authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972), 
was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as 
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of 
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see 
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275); 
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6, 
pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States 
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone 
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain 
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and 
make known the same to [the appropriate] authority .... " 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113.5 Although the 
4 See, e. g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968); 
id., at 48-49; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F. R. D. 
406, 413-414 (1965); cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 
(1975). 
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhanc-
ing" the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The 
question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is 
relevant to the currently understood goal,,; of sentencing. We do note, 
however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing peti-
tioner's first conviction, observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity 
with the facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's current sentence is 
a "very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F . 2d 815, (1979) 
(Separate Statement on Denial of Rehearing en bane) . The sentence of 
two to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalty for 
a "substantial drug distributor," ibid., who plied his trade while on parole 
from a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
6 The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 U. S. C. § 4, Jt has 
6 
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross 
in.difference to the duty to report known criminal behavior 
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship. 
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when 
the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities himself .. 
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no 
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities. 
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors 
of heroin in his own ·community in exchange for a favorable 
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner 
rejected an "obligatio[n] of community life" that should be 
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 
(1958). Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate protected 
his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to 
resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available 
to a sentencing judge are more relevant to "'the likelihood 
that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope that 
he may respond to rehabilitative effort)"to assist with a 
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or 
does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United 
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v. 
Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974) . 
III 
Petitioner does not seriously contf'lnd that disregard for 
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant 
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather 
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legiti-
mate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In 
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal 
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for 
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative 
act of concealment or participation;' See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S, 
665, 696, n, 36 (1972), · 
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rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court 
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
These arguments would have merited serious consideration 
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge. 
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or 
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct 
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. 1.'he District Court had 
no opportunity to consider the theoI'ies that petitioner now 
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's 
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransi-
gency would be used against him, neitheI' he nor his lawyer 
offered any explanation ~o the sentencing court. Even after 
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could 
be viewed as evidenc!=l of continuing criminal intent, petitioner 
remained silent. 
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to 
remain silent and that no adverse inferences can be drawn 
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument sin-
gularly unpersuasive. The Finh Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimi0:ation is not self-executing. At least 
where the government has no substantial reason to believe 
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, 
the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a 
timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653-
655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970) ; 
see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976) 
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J .) ; id.,' at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J ., 
con~urring in the judgment) .~ 
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 
273 U. S. 103, 113 (1927), petitioner "did not assert his privi-
6 The Court recognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 
fl/59-661 (1976), that this rule i,; subject to exception when some coer'cive 
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his 
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in thi~ case'. 
See· p. -, inf ra. 
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Jege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony 
because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination, 
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The 
Court added in Y ajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed 
waived if not in some mann~r fairly brought to the attention 
of the tribunal whicp must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if 
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged, 
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court 
could have determined whether his claim was legitimate.7 
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by 
arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection 
for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence 
described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amend-
ment and adds 110thing to it. Although Miranda's require-
ment of specific warnings cr~ates a limited exception to the 
rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does 
not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive cus-
todial interrogations for which it was designed. The warn-
ings protect persons who, e-xposed to such interrogation 
without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable 
to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v. 
United States, supra, at 657.8 
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Peti-
tioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with 
.7 See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, n. 11; Hoffman v. United 
States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 
364-366 (1917); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 
1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 911 (1971) . It is the duty of a court to 
determine ihe legitimacy of a. witnes;;' reliance upon the Fifth Amend-
ment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951) . A wit-
ness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he 
simply would prefer not to give. 
8 In United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977) , the 
Court explained that "[a]ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to 
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which 
the 'Court thought was caused by isolation of a s11spect in police c~$tody."' 
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investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given 
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim 
that he was coerced.9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented 
by counsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that 
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to 
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he 
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither 
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwill-
ingness to provide information• vital to law enforcement 
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of 
self-incrimination. 
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired 
his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'" 
Garner v. United States , 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941). His conduct bears no 
resemblance to the "insolubly ambiguous" post-arrest silence 
that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda 
warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617-618 (1976). 
We conclude that the District Court committed no constitu-
tional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner's sentence on 
the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted inter-
ference with a function traditionally vested in the trial courts. 
See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441 
(1974). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is 
Affirmed. 
9 The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 43p (1966) , when he first confessed his 
involvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v. 
Roberts, No. 75--619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975) ; see App. 16, n . 4.-
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1Vfa. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The Court today permits a term of imprisonment to be 
increased because of a defendant's refusal to identify others 
involved in criminal activities-a refusal that was not unlaw-
ful and that may have been motivated by a desire to avoid 
self-incrimination or by a reasonable fear of reprisal. I do 
not believe that a defendant's failure to inform on others may 
properly be used to aggravate a sentence of imprisonment, 
and accordingly, I dissent. 
The majority does not disf>ute that a failure to disclose the 
identity of others involved in criminal activity ma.y often 
stem from a desire to avoid self-incrimination. This ca.se is 
an excellent illustration of that possibility. The prosecutor 
asked petitioner "to identify the person or persons from whom 
he ,vas getting the drugs, and the location. and to lay out the 
conspiracy and identify other co-conspirators who were in-
volved ,vith them." App. 36. Disclosure of this information 
m1ght ,ve11 have exposed petitioner to prosecution on addi-
tional charges.1 He was never offered immunity from such 
1 The prosecutor stated at the sentencing hearing that the Government \; 
initial offer of lenienc:, in exch,mge for petitioner's cooperation wa,; made 
on the as~umption that he was a relatively minor figure in the conspiracy. 
The Government argued for lengthy consecutive sentences, however, 
becau::,e "we were shown to be wrong" about that assumption. It seems 
plain that if petitioner had provided the information requested, he would 
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prosecution . Petitioner's right to refuse to incriminate him-
self on additional charges was not, of course, extinguished 
by his guilty plea. 
There can be no doubt that a judge would be barred from 
increasing the length of a jaj} sentence because of a defend-
ant's refusal to cooperate based on the constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination. In such a case. the threat of a 
longer sentence of imprisonment would plainly be compulsion 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See M cGautha 
v. California, 402 U. S. 183 ( 1971). Such an aggravation of 
sentence would amount to an impermissible pellalty imposed 
solely because of the defendant 's assertion of the Fifth 
Ameudment privilege. 
I also believe that it would be an abuse of discretion for a 
judge to use a defendanfs refusal to become an informer to 
increase the length of a sentence when the refusal was moti-
vate<l by a fear of retaliation. 2 In such a case, the failure to 
identify other participants in the crime is irrevelant to the 
defen<lant's prospects for rehabilitation , see ante, at 6. and 
bears no relation to any of the legitimate purposes of sentenc-
ing. See t'11ited States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41 (1978); 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 ( 1972) . 
In this case. then, petitioner's refusal to provide the re-
quesle<l information was lawful 3 and may have been moti-
2 In drtPrmining wlwtlwr a refu:;al to cooperaie c·an be takrn into con-
;;idnation when ba;;ed on a fear of repri8al, the relrvant inquir~·, of cour~e, 
1s whetlwr the defendant in fact 1rn:; a subjc•cti vc fear, not whether the fear 
is object1vel~· rea,;onable. It i::; when the defendant is acttwlly afraid of 
repri::;al that In,- failure to cooperate has no relenmce to the legitimate 
purpo~P of :;ent('ncing 
~ The Court rd<'f~ to the ancient offpn::;E' of mi:;pri:;ion of felon) , ante, al 
5-6. but a, it,- own d1:-cu,;"ion ~hows, petitioner could not haYC' been p un -
ished undt' r 18 l1 . S. C. § 7 (1976). See id, IL 5. The Government hm, 
nen•r ('Olltl'nclrd that prt1t1oner':; behav10r wa,; otlwr than lawful. A d1"-
cu,-~ion of the continued vitality of law,:; makin~ it a crime to fai l lo 
report criminal bc•ha vior is unneee::;"ary to th1::; ca,;c. ] ob::;c1-vc only that 
s11rl1 law,; 11av<• fallen into Yirtually complete d1::;u"e, a development tbat 
78-1793-DISSEKT 
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATE 3 
vated by the possibility of self-incrimination or a reasonable 
fear of reprisal. The majority acknowledges that these claims 
"would have merited serious consideration if they had been 
presented properly to the sentencing judge." Ante, at 7. 
Because petitioner did not expressly state these grounds to 
the sentencing judge, however, the Court indulges the assump-
tion that petitioner's refusal was motivated by a desire to 
"preserv[e] his ability to resume criminal activities upon 
release." Ante, at 6. I am at a loss to discern any eviden-
tiary basis for this assumption.4 And I reject the Court's 
reftpc•t;:, n dPeply rooted :,ocial perception that the geueral ritizenry ,;hould 
not be forced to participate in !he enterprise of crnne detl'd10n. See Note, 
27 Ha~iing~ L. ReY. 175, 181-187 (1975); ~ote, 2:3 Emory L. J. 1095 
( 1\17-!). Cf. Glazebrook, ".\Iispri:,1011 of Felony-Shadow or Phan tom?, 
8 Am . . J. Lrgal Hi,;tory 189, 23;3 (Pt:-:. 1 and 2) (19U-!). A,; .\Ir. Chief 
Justice .\Iar~hnll ~lated, "lt ma)' be the duty of a citizen lo accu,;e every 
ofknder, and to proclaim every offense which come,; to hi~ konwledge; but 
the law winch would puni:-:h him in every t'a~e for not performing thi:-! duty 
i~ too har~h for man." Marbury v. Bruoks, 7 Wheat. 556, 575-576 
(1822) . 
4 lndf'rd, thP rrC'ord lrnrdl)· 8UJJJ)Ol't,; the Court ',; c:haracterization of 
Robnts' behavior as "mtrau::;igrnc)·." Ante, at 7. Except for hi:, refusal 
to ident1f,· ,1dcht1onal participants, petitioner was quite hl'lpf11I. He volun-
tarily ,1c·comp,u11cd .\-k Payner to the office of the 11ni1ed States 11ttorney. 
At that lime. a,- the Government conceded at the ,;entenci11g hearing, "we 
had no 1clr>a of tlw identity of who it wa,; who wa" u"ing that green Jaguar 
automohile to feIT) ' narrotics about the city." App. 15a. i\Is. Payner 
said shr lent the c:ar to petitioner, and lw agrePd to be mterviewed. At 
that initial intPrview, he confe::;"ed, implicated a co-con,<pirator. and volun-
tanh· expJaim•d thP meaning of code word,- w-;ed Ill tlw con::;p1racy. 
The Court al,;o relic•,< on Judge :\IacKinnon\ a:-:<rrtion that till' sentence 
was '·very light" for a ",;ub,;tantia l drug d1::;trib11tor.' A11tr, at 5, 11. 4. 
Of c•ollf~P, pet1t 10ner lhd not plead guilty to conspiracy or to lh,-tnbuhon 
of heroin, but to two counb of unlawful m;e of a tc]Pphum' to facilitate 
the distnbut1on or heroin. Each count wm; puni~hable b~- a maximum of 
four year~ impnsomnent and a $30,000 fine, and pet1t10ner wa~ sentenced 
to con,-ecutivc 1- to 4-year terms. Al, the sc•ntencing hP,tring, petitioner'~ 
coun~el ~tatrd that he had Leen unable to find a :-;ingle ca"e •' in winch any 
fpderal ,1uclge has ever given consecutive sentCllC'('S for two or more phone 
ro1mr, ." App 28 The Goverment has nevr1 challr>ngr<l tlu;c assertion, 
4 
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harsh and rigid approach to the issue of waiver. especially 
in a context in which it was hardly clear that reasons for peti-
tioner's failure to cooperate had to be identified before the 
sentencing juclge.5 
Furthermore. the bare failure to cooperate in an investiga-
tion of others cannot. without further inquiry, justify a con-
clusive negative inference about "the meaning of that conduct 
with respect to I thr defendant's] prospects for rehabilitation 
and restoration to a useful placf' in society." United States v. 
Grayso fl,, 438 r. R. 48. 55 ( 1978). A fear of reprisal against 
one's self or one's family or a desire to avoid further self-
incrimination are equally plausible explanations for such con-
duct. Even the desire to "do his own time" without becoming 
a police iuformer might explain petitioner's behavior without 
11ecessarily indicating that he intended to "resume criminal 
activities upon his release." Ante, at 6. The inference that 
petition er was a poor candidate for rehabilitation could not 
be justified without additional information.6 
The enhancement of petitioner's sentence. then. vvas imper-
5 The scutmcing hearing took place on April 21, 1978. At that time , 
there was no ~ettled law on the que::,tion whether fo1lun· to cooiwrnte could 
be con~iJerrd a~ an aggmvating factor in ~enten(•ing. Comparr Cntted 
State~ Y. Garcia . . 5H F. 2d 6~1, 684-1586 (CA3 Hl7li) (improprr factor). 
and Cnited State;; ,·. Rogers, 504 F. 2J 1079 (CA5 1974) (~ame). with 
United States v. Ch(l'0dez-Castro. 430 F. 2d 7GG (CA, 1970) (proper 
factor). :'\or wa::: tlwre an~· rule that a defrndant was required to identify 
rra~on,-; for hi~ failun• to coopera te. For tlll' Court to hold in thc0 ~e 
circum:stnnee~ that thr def Pndant '::: :;i]enee amounted to '·an rntentional 
n·linqui:;hment or al.Htnclomnent of a known right or prh·ilegl', " Juhuson v 
Zerb;st. 304 r. S. 451', -164 (19:37), sePIM to me rxtraordinanl~· "tern in 
light of tlw Court',-, tr,tditional indulgence of'' 'ever~· rea;:;onable pre,;ump-
tion again,-;t waiver ' of fnndamental constitutional nght~. " lbul. (c1tation 
omittt>d). 
u In thi~ l'Pl:iJ>Pd, petitio11er '~ conduct was quitl' differe11t from the 
delilwratc perjury involv('d in Cnited .Statt's ,·. Gray;,;011. 438 U. S. 41 
(197S). Perjur~· 1~ 1t:,;elf a ~enou:; crime, a " ·mn11ipulat1,·e clehancP of 
the la\\·,'' ' id. , at 51, quoting Cnited States , . Hendrix. 505 F. 2d 1233',, 
1236 (CA2 197-1) , that <:orrupts the trial proce:--~. 
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rnissible because it may have burdened petitioner's exercise 
of his constitutional rights or been based on a factor unrelated 
to the permissible goals of sentencing. In addition, it repre-
sented an improper involvement of the judicial office in the 
prosecutorial function that should be corrected through the 
exercise of our supervisory power over the federal courts.7 
The usual method for obtaining testimony which may be 
self-incriminatory is through a grant of immunity from 
prosecution. See 18 U.S. C. § 6001 et seq. (1976). Prosecu-
tors would have little incentive to offer defendants 1mmuuity 
for their testimony if they could achieve the same result with-
out giving up the option to prosecute. There is no suggestion 
here that an offer of immunity was ever extended to peti-
tioner. If a defendant knows his silence may be used against 
him to enhance his sentence, he rna.y be put to a.11 unfair 
choice. He must either give incriminating information with 
no assurance that he will not be prosecuted 011 the basis of 
that information. or face the possibility of an increased sen-
tence because of his noncooperation. Since a prosecutor ma.y 
overcome a Fifth Amendment claim through an offer of immu-
nity, I see no reason to put defendants to such a choice. 
A second method available to the prosecutor for obtaining 
a defendant's testimony against others is the plea bargaining 
process. The Court has upheld that process 011 the theory 
7 A:; the Court uotes. 18 U.S. C. § ;3577 provides tlrnt " [n lo limitation 
shall be placed on the information . . . which a court of tlw United States 
may receiYP and c-onsider for the purpo,;e of impo:::mg an appropnate 
sentenee." Thi~ ;;tatutr , however, was merely a cod1ficat10n of the sen-
tencing standards :::et forth in ffilliams "· New York, :337 l ·. S. 241 (1949). 
Nothing in th e ~tatute or it:- legislativl' hi:::tory ,;ugge:::t:s a con~reE,:ional 
intent10n to ovPrturn or limit this Court's historic power,; of ::;uprrvision 
over the coll duct of criminal ea,;e::; in the federal courts. SPc• M esaroh v. 
United Siate&. 352 0. S. 1, 14 (1956). There is no warrant for the con-
clus10n that l~ U . 8. C . § :3577, which was de:;igned to codify existing Judi-
cial practice::;, operate::; a;: a bar to the u:;e of tho::;e ~upervi:;ory powers to 
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that the relative equality of bargaining power between the 
prosecutor and the defendant prevents the process from being 
fundamentally unfair. Santobello v. 1\'ew York , 404 U. S. 
257, 261 (1971). But if the judge can be counted on to in-
crease the defendant's sentence if he fails to cooperate, the 
balance of bargaining power is tipped in favor of the prosecu-
tion. Not only is the prosecutor able to offer less in exchange 
for cooperation. but a defendant may agree for fear of incur-
ring the displeasure of the sentencing judge. To insure that 
defendants will not be so intimidated into accepting plea bar-
gains, federal judges are forbidden from participating in the 
bargaining process. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 ( e) ( l); 
ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty ~ 3.3 (a) (Appr. Draft, 
1968). As Judge Bazelon observed below, "The trial judge, 
whose impartiality is a cornerstone of our criminal justice 
system. may be tempted , under the guise of exercising discre-
tion in sentencing, to join forces with the prosecutor in secur-
ing the defendant's cooperation." - U. S. App. D. C. -, 
- , -- F. 2d -, - (1979) . I do not believe that we 
should a1low that possibility. 
I find disturbing the majority's willingness to brush aside 
these 1:-erious objections to the propriety of petitioner's sen-
tence on the strength of '' the duty to report known criminal 
behav10r," ante, at 6. According to the Court, petitioner's 
refusal to become an informer was a rejection of a "deeply 
rooted rncial obligation," ante, at 6. All citizens apparently 
are "obliged to assist the authorities" in this way. and peti-
tioner's failure to do so was not only "a badge of irresponsi-
ble citizenship," but constituted "antisocial conduct'' as well. 
Ante, at 6, 7. 
Th~ Court supports its stern conclusions about petitioner's 
civic duty only by reference to the concepts of "hue and cry" 
and "misprision of felony.' ' Those concepts were developed 
in an era in which enforcement of the cnminal law was en-
trustt'd t.o the general citizenry rather than to an organized 
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police force. 8 But it is unnecessary to discuss in detail the 
historical context of such concepts. so different from o:.ir 
present-day society, in order to reject the Court's analysis. 
American society has always approved those ,vho own 
up to their wrongdoing and vow to do better, just as it has 
admired those who come to the aid of the victims of criminal 
conduct. But our admiration of those who inform on others 
has never been as unambiguous as the majority suggests. The 
countervailing socia.I values of loyalty and personal privacy 
have prevented us from imposing on the citizenry at large a 
duty to join in the business of crime detection. If the Court's 
view of social mores were accurate, it ,,.:ould be hard to under-
stand how terms such as "stoolpigeon." "snitch." "sq uealer ," 
and "tattletale" have come to be the common description of 
those who engage in such behavior. 
I do not. of course. suggest that those who have engaged 
in criminal activity should refuse to cooperate with the 
authorities. The informer plays a vital role in the struggle 
to check crime, especially the narcotics trade. We could not 
do without him. In recognition of this role, it is fullv appro-
priat'3 to enco urage such behavior by offering leniency in 
exchange for "cooperation."" Cooperation of that sort ma.y 
8 Cf. F. Pollock & F. :\Iait land, The History of English Law 582- 583 
(2d ed. 1903). 
0 The majority expres::;e,; "doubt tlrnt a principled distinct icn nw~· be 
drnwn b etween 'enhan cing ' the punishment im11osed upon the petitio ner 
and denYing him tlw ·]enienc~·' he claims would be appropriate if he 
cooperated ." Aull'. at 5, n . 4. But a8 Judgr Lumba rd has stated. '·It 1s 
one thing to cxtrud lrni rney to a defendant who i~ w11ling lo coonrrate 
with the government: it i~ quite anothrr thing to administrr add1t10nal 
punishment to a dPfrndant \\'ho bY hi~ silr nce hns romm1tted no 11ddi-
tional ofkn~e." Unitf!cl States v. Ramo1;, 572 F. 2d :360, 36:3, n. 2 (CA2 
1978) (concurring opimon). At the most the di;; t i11ct1011 mar be difficult 
to adrnini;;ter : it i;; c:crtainly a principled one, appeariPg in similar form 
in several area::; of t he law. For cxa mplr, a distinction has been re ~ogn1zed 
between extending lenient~· to a ddrndant who pleads guilt~· and angment -
ing t he sf'ntence of a defrndl! n t who elects to stand trial. Sre, e. y. , Umted 
8 
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be a sign of repe11tance and the beginning of rehabilitation.10 
But our government has allowed its citizens to decide for 
themselves whether to enlist in the enterprise of enforcing 
the criminal laws; it has never imposed a duty to do so, as the 
Court's opinion suggests. I find no justification for creating 
such a duty in this case and applying it only to persons about 
to be sentenced for a crime. 
States v. Araujo, 539 F. 2d 2fi.7 (CA2 1976); Scott v. United States, 135 
U. S. App. D. C. 377, 419 F. 2d 264 (19fi9): United States v. Thompson, 
476 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (CA7 197:3), United States v. Stockwell, 472 F. 2d 
1176 (CA9 1974) : [;11ited States v. Derrick, 519 F. 2d l (CA6 1975). 
Writing for th<' Court, ;\IR. JmsncE PowELL rehecl in i1foher v. Roe, 432 
U. S. 464, 475-477 ( HJ77), on a rlo:-<ely analogou:-; di:stinctioll "between 
direct state intrrference with a protPcted activity and ::;tate encourage-
ment of an altnnativc artivit~· c011somrnt with legislative policy." (In 
certain circumstances, of course, "state pncouragement of an alternative 
activity" may also be constitutional!~· impermi:s:sible. See icl., at 482-490 
[BRENNAN, J ., dis:senting] ; id .. at 454-462 [MARSHALL, J. , di:s,-;enting]. 
In this case, however, it i::< agreed that no con::;titutional objection would 
be raisPd by an offer of leniency made to induce cooperation on the part 
of a defendant.) 
10 Petitioner agrees that the extent of a defendant'e cooperation with 
prosecuting authoritie:-< ma~· be taken into account in granting leniency. 
Cooperation, like ro11fpssio11, may br relevant to whether thC' defendant 
has taken an initial step toward rehabilitation. The corollary inference, 
however, that failure to inform on ot11er;:; means that rehabilitation i;:; 
unlikely, does not neces,,a rily follow. A~ th e United State:; Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained in a similar ~Ptting: 
" [W]hile it is true that a defendant 's lack of <le;;ire for rehabilitation ma~, 
properly be con;:;idered in i111po::<ing srutruce, to 1wnnit the ~Pntencing judge 
to infer ,;uch lack of desire Irom a defendant's rdu::;al to provide le<i-
timony would leave little farer to the rule that defendant may not be 
puni~he<l for exerci:,;ing hi;:; right to remain ;:;i lent. \Ioreover, we que;:;tion 
how much refusal to testify indicate,, an ab::;ence of rehabilit ative dPsire, 
given that defendanb often provide such te:,;timony simpl>· to get back at 
their former a~:,;ociateH or to obtain a brtter deal from the Government. 
In an>· cvrnt. refu;:;al to te:-<tify, particularly in narcotics cases, is more 
likcl>· to testify, particularly in narcotic~ ca~e~, i::; more likely to be the 
result of wrll-founded fear"' of rpprisal to tlH' witnrss or hit< family. " 
DiGiov(tnni v. Uuitecl States, 596 F . 2d 74, 75 (CA2 1979) . 
. 
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In fact, the notion that citizens may be compelled to become 
informers is contrary to my understanding of the fulldamental 
nature of our criminal law. Some legal systems have been 
premised on the obligation of an accused to answer all ques-
tions put to him. In other societies law-abiding behavior is 
encouraged by penalizing citizens who fail to spy on their 
neighbors or report illfractions. Our country, thankfully, has 
never chosen that path. As highly as we value the directives 
of our criminal la.ws. we place their enforcement in the hands 
of public officers, and we do not give those officers the author-
ity to impress the citizenry into the prosecutorial enterprise. 
By today's decision. the Court ignores this precept, and it does 
so in a settiug that both threatens Fifth Amendment rights 
and encourages arbitrary and irrational sentencing. 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-
.itqJrmtt Q}iturl 4lf flrt ~b ,itattg 
Jru~ ,. Q}. 21lffe'1, 
April 2, 1980 
RE: No. 78-1793 Roberts v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
✓ 
I'll be writing separately in the above. I'll do 
my best to get it out very soon. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATI! 
No. 78-1793 
Winfield L. Roberts Petitioner !On Writ of Certiorari to the 
I J v. United States Court of 
United States. Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. 
[March A' 1980] 
MR. JUSTICE P0WELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly con-
sidered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
][ 
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to 
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance 
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne 
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told 
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to peti-
tioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's sug-
gestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer 
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily, 
the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) . They also told him that he 
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would 
stay, the investigtors asked whether he knew "Boo" Thorn .. 
ton, then the principal target of the heroin investigation. 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton 
vn several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed . 
drug tr~Il$actions with Thornton in certain intercepted ~
2 
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code 
words used in the conversations. When asked to name sup-
pliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although 
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of -his 
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he 
provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to dis-
tri u e · . . C. § 841, 846, and four counts of using 
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 U. S. C. 
§ 843 (b) .1 He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Govern .. 
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. ·In 
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the con-
spiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years' 
imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately dis-
closed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977). 
On remand, petitioner p1ed guilty to two counts of tele-
phone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Govern-
ment to seek a substantial sentence. 'The Government filed 
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. 2 'The memorandum 
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank 
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent 
refusal to name suppliers. ·The memorandum also empha-
sized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial 
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin 
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and 
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences ~ -
1 Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could 
have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone 
App. 36. 
2 The maximum sentence on each count wa:, four years' imprisonment 
an4 a 430,000 fine. ~I U.S. C. §841 (o). / ' 
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs 
for personal profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that peti-
tioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to proba .. 
tion. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concur-
rent sentences that would result in his immediate release. H~ 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that 
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the 
request for probation was "ironic" in iight of petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of 
"many, many years, knowing what he faces_ ;, Id., at 36. 
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into 
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that 
the defendant has cooperated .... " Ibid. Stressing the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitiga-
tion, the Government recommended a substantial prison term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one 
to four years on each count and a speciai paroie term of three 
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained 
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was 
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to 
cooperate with the Government.3 Petitioner again appealed, 
eontending for the first time that the sentencing court should 
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the spe-
cial parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. - ~ 
3 Before impo::;ing sentence, the court explained: 
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have 
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which 
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were 
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate witb 
the <'Government,.'' A pp. 40. / 
4 
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U, S. App. D. C. -, 600 F. 2d 815 (1979). We granted 
certiorari, 440 U.S. - (1979), and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United 
States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Qon-
gress has directed that 
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a 
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of impos-
ing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577. 
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy 
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New Yark, 
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the 
"fundamental sentencing principle" that -" 'a judge may 
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may con-
sider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States 
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 
U. S. 443, 446 ( 1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process 
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinforma-
tion of constitutional magnitude." United States· v. Tucker, 
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740--741 
(1948). 
No such misinformation was present in this case.·· The 
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. 
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests 
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does 
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested 
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with 
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
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his behavior .. .. " Brief for Petitioner 17 .4 Unless a differ-
ent explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in 
the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference 
that these laudable attitudes are lacking. 
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has 
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty 
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the 
authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972), 
was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as 
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of 
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521- 522; see 
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275); 
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6, 
pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States 
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone 
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain 
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and 
make know__n th to the appropriate] authority .. . . " 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § D Sta-q. 113.5 Although the/ 
4 See, e. g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Plea:; of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968) ; 
id., at 48-49 ; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F . R. D. 
406, 413-414 (1965) ; cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 
(1975) . 
We doubt that a principled distinctiou may be drawn between "enhanc-
ing" the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The 
question for deci;;ion i;; simply whether petit ioner's failure to cooperate is 
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note, 
however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing peti-
tioner 's first conviction, observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity 
with the facts of this entire case" that the petit ioner's current sentence is 
a "very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F . 2d 815, ( 1979) 
(Separate Statement on Denial of Rehearing en bauc). The sentence of 
two to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalty for 
a "substantial drug distributor," ibid .. who plied his trade while on parole 
from a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
5 The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 U. S. C. § 4. It has 
6 
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross 
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior 
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship. 
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when 
the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities· himself. 
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against seif-
incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no 
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities. 
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors 
of heroin in his own comrnQnity in exchange for a favorable 
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner 
rejected an "obligatio [n] of community life" that should be 
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, • The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 
(1958). Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate protected 
his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his-ability to 
resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available 
to a sentencing judge are more relevant to "'the likelihood 
that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope that 
he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with -a 
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or 
does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United 
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States • v. 
Hendrix, 505 F . 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974) . 
III 
Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for· 
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant 
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather 
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legiti-
mate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In 
view of these concerns, petitioner eonehicle~at his refusal 
to act as an informer has no· bearing on liis prospects for-~ 
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime arid some affirmative• 
act of concealment or participatiori." See· Branzburg v .'H ayes, 408 U. S,. 
' 665, 696, n. 36 (1972) . ~ 
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rehabilitation. He also cont~nuis j that the -District Court ~ 
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
These arguments would have merited serious consideration 
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge. 
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or 
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct 
irrelevant to the sentencing decision . ·The District Court had 
no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now 
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's 
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransi-
gency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer 
offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after 
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could 
be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner 
remained silent. 
~ 
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to 
remain silent and that no adverse inferences can be drawn 
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument sin-
gularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least 
where the government has no substantial reason to believe 
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, 
the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a 
timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U . S. 648, 653-
655 (1976): United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970); 
see United States v. Mandujano , 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976) 
(opinion of BURGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring in the judgment) .11 
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, / 
273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927) , petitioner "did not assert his privi/ 
8 The Court rerognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 
659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive 
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs hi 
CJ 8 ... °I \ choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case. 
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lege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony 
because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination. 
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The 
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed 
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention 
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if 
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged, 
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court 
could ha.ve determined whether his claim was legitimate.7 
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by 
arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection 
for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence 
described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amend-
ment and adds nothing to it. Although Miranda's require-
ment of specific warnings creates a limited exception to. the 
rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does 
not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive cus-
todial interrogations for which it was designed. - The warJ1-
ings protect persons who, exposed to such interrogation 
without the assistance of counsel , otherwise might be unable 
to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. ·Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v .. 
United States, supra, at 657.8 
There was no custodial interrogation 
tioner volunteered his confession at his 
in this case. Peti-
first interview with --------
r See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, n. 11 ; Hoffman v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 
364-366 (1917) ; United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 
1970), cert. denied , 402 U. S. 911 (1971). It. is the duty of a court to 
determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amend-
ment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951) . A wit-
ness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he 
simply would prefer not to give. 
8 In United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977) , the 
Court explained that "[a] ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to 
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which 
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investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given 
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim 
that he was coerced.9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented 
by counsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that 
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to 
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he 
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither 
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwill-
ingness to provide information vital to law enforcement 
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of 
self-incrimination. 
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired 
his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'" 
"Garner v. United States,l~4 B. 8., at 657, quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U. S. 219. 241 (1941). His conduct bears no 
resemblance to the "insolubly ambiguous" post-arrest silence 
that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda 
warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Oh-io, 426 U.S. 610. 617-618 (1976). 
We conclude that the District Court committed no constitu-
tional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner's sentence on 
the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted inter-
ference with a function traditiona.lly vested in the trial courts. 
See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440--441 




The District_ Court found that petitioner freely waived his~rights ~ t""-if~ 
A.f:1 Js e. d:1t2&1t&, 8§4 a'. 8. YOU (13681), when he first confessed his 
olvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v. 
berts, No. 75-619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4. 
10 The dis.-;t>nting opinion n,;.~erts that thr record reflects an "improper 
i1n-olvemi>11t of the judiria.1 office in th~ pro~Pc-11toriaJ func-tion ." Post . 
at 5. Wfl find no ba.~i"' for thi,. ront-C'ntion . The Di,-trirt Court did not 
participate in the plt',t-bargaiuing process; it merely undertook a, retro-
f 
e<'~ivr re,·iew of_ I ho c e ide t1e@ 1·P~11Fding r_ietitioner ',.; eha rad Pr, recor~, :nd 





:Fed. Rule Crim. fProc. 32 (c) . And n. defendant who failed even to raise 
the 1~ibility of self-incrimination or retaliation over a cour~ of three years 
is hanlly in a position to complain that he was "put to an unfair choice." 
Poat, at 5. 
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F 
b,1 jo: The Chief Justice 
t~ 011> Kr. Justice Brennan ltr. Justice Stewa.I't 
Kr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice ~arohllll 
Mr. Justice Blaokmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
4~i From: ?ih-. Justice Polf811 
~80 Circulated: EEB 2 a 1980 
zJ Reci rculated: 
_J-!('DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATI! 
No. 78-1793 
v. United States Court of 
Winfield L. Roberts, Petitioner, !On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States. Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. 
[March-, 1980] 
Ma. JusTrCE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly con-
sidered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
I 
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to 
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance 
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne 
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told 
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to peti-
tioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's sug-
gestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer 
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily, 
the investiga.tors gave him the warnings required by Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) . They also told him that he 
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would 
stay, the investigtors asked whether he knew "Boo" Thorn-
ton , then the principal target of the heroin investigation. 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton 
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed 
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code 
words used in the conversations. When asked to name sup• 
pliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although 
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his 
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he 
provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to dis• 
tribute heroin, 21 U.S. C. § 841, "846, and four counts of using 
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin , 21 U. S. C. 
§ 843 (b) .1 He retained a ·1awyer, who rejected the Govern• 
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In 
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the con• 
spiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years' 
imprisonment, three yea.rs' special parole, and a $5,000 fine. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately dis• 
closed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977) . 
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of tele• 
phone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Govern• 
ment to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed 
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine.2 The memorandum 
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank 
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent 
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also empha-
sized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial 
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin 
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and 
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences 
1 Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could 
have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone .. 
App. 36. 
2 The maximum ~entence on each count was four years' imprisomneni 
and a $30,000 fine. 21 U. S. C. § 843 (c). 
·-
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs 
for personal profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense ·counsel noted that peti-
tioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to proba-
tion. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concur-
rent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that 
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the 
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of 
"many, many years, knowing what he faces. " Id. , at 36. 
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into 
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that 
the defendant has cooperated. . . ." Ibid. Stressing the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitiga-
tion, the Government recommended a substantial prison term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one 
to four years on each count and a special parole term of three 
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained 
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was 
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to 
cooperate with the Government.3 Petitioner again appealed, 
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should 
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the spe-
cial parole term but otherwise a.ffirmed the judgment. -
8 Before imposing sentence, the court explained : 
"Mr. Roberts, we have corn,idered your case very carefully. We have 
noted again you were on varole from a bank robbery conviction, which 
you have had prior involvement with the law. In t his case you were 
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with 
the Government." App. 40. 
1 
78-1793-0PINIQN 
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES 
U. S. App. D. C. -, 600 F. 2d 815 (1979), We granteq 
pertiorari, 440 U.S. - (1979) , and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United 
~tates District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Con-
~ress has directed that 
" [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information con .. 
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a,. 
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of impos-
ing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577. 
ri'his Court has feviewed in detail the history and philosophy 
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New Yark, 
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the 
"fundamental sentencing principle" tha,t "'a judge may 
appropriately conduct an _inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited either as to th~ kind of information he may con~ 
sider, or the source fro!Il which it may come.' " United States 
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 
U. S. 443, 446 ( 1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process 
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinforma-
tion of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker, 
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741 
(1948). 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. 
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests 
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does 
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested 
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with 
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
'cohhection to a defendant's willingness to shape up anti change 
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his behavior .... " Brief for Petitioner 17.4 Unless a differ-
ent explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in 
the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference 
that these laudable attitudes are lacking. 
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has 
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty 
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the 
authorities," Bra:nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972) , 
was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as 
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of 
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see 
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275); 
Statute of ·westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6, 
pp. 112- 115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States 
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone 
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain 
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and 
make known the same to [ the appropriate] authority . ... " 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113.5 Although the 
4 See, e. g., ABA -Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standard~ Rela t ing to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968) ; 
id., at 48-49 ; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F . R. D. 
406, 413-414 (1965) ; cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 
(1975). 
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhanc-
ing" the puni;;lunent imposed upon the petitioner and denying him t he 
" leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The 
question for deci;;ion is simply whether petitioner 's failure to cooperate is 
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note, 
however, that Judge lVIacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing peti-
tioner 's first conviction , observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity 
with the facts of this entire case" that the pet itioner's current sentence is 
a "very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F . 2d 815, (1979) 
(Separate Statement on Denial of Rehearing en bane ) . The sentence of 
two to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalty for 
a "substant ial drug distributor," ibid., who plied his t rade while on parole 
from a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
11 The statute, as amended, is still in effect . 18 U. S. C. § 4. rt has 
6 
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross 
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior 
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship. 
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when 
the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities himself. 
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no 
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities. 
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors 
of heroin in his own community in exchange for a favorable 
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner 
rejected an ''obligatio [n] of community life" that should be 
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 
(1958). Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate protected 
his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to 
resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available 
to a sentencing judge are more relevant to " 'the likelihood 
that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope that -t S 
he may respond to rehabilitative effortJ to assist with a 
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or 
does not deem himself at war with his suciety.'" United 
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v. 
Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974). 
III 
Petitioner does not seriously cont~nd that disregard for 
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant 
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather 
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legiti-
mate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In 
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal 
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for 
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative 
act of concealment or participation," See l3ranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 
fi65, 696, D. 36 (1972) , 
·-
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rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court 
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
These arguments would have merited serious consideration 
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge. 
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations ol' 
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct 
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. 1.'he District Court had 
no opportunity to consider the theoI'ies that petitioner now 
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's 
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransi-
gency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer 
offered any explana.tion to the sentencing court. Even after 
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could 
be viewed as evidenc!cl of continuing criminal intent, petitioner. 
remained silent. 
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to 
remain silent and that no adverse inferences ca.n be drawn 
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument sin-
gularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least 
where the government has no substantial reason to believe 
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, 
the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a 
timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653-
655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); 
see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976) 
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring in the judgment).6 
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 
273 U. S. 103, 113 ( 1927), petitioner "did not assert his privi-
6 The Court recognized in Garnei· v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 
659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive 
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his 
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been tdentified · in this case. 
See· p .. -. infra. 
8 
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Jege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony 
because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination. 
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The 
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed 
waived if not in some manne~ fairly brought to the attention 
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if 
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged, 
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court 
could have determined whether his claim was legitimate.7 
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by 
arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection 
for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence 
described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amend-
ment and adds i10thing to it. Although Miranda's require-
ment of specific warnings creates a limited exception to the 
I 
rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does 
not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive cus-
todial interrogations for which it was designed. The warn-
ings protect persons who, e-xposed to such interrogation 
without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable 
to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v. 
United States, supra, at 657.8 
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Peti-
tioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with 
7 See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, 11. 11; Hoffman v. United 
States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 
364-366 (1917) ; United States v. V ermeulen, 436 F . 2d 72, 76--77 (CA2 
1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 911 (1971) . It is t he duty of a court to 
determine the legitimacy of a. witnes::;' reliance upon the Fifth Amend-
ment . Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951 ). A wit-
ness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony t hat he 
simply would prefer not t o give. 
8 In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977) , the 
Court explained that "[a]ll Miranda',, safeguards, which are designed to 
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on t he overbearing compulsion which 
the 'Court thought was caused by isolation of a suspect in police c"(lstody." 
. .,., 
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investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given 
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim 
that he was coerced.9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented 
by counsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that 
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to 
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he 
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither 
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwill-
ingness to provide information- vital to law enforcement 
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of 
self-incrimination. 
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired 
his " 'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.' " 
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U, S. 219, 241 ( 1941). His conduct bears no 
resemblance to the "insolubly ambiguous" post-arrest silence 
that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda 
warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976). 
We conclude that the District Court committed no constitu .. 
tional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner's sentence on 
the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted inter-
ference with a function traditiona.lly vested in the trial courts. ~ 
See Dorszynski v. U ,'t Sta,tes, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441 10 
(1974). ccor mgly, the judgment of the Court of ppeas 
is 
Affirmed. 
9 The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under 
Mii-anda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 43p (1966), when he first confessed his 
involvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v. :;:r• ;;;;;t 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4, 
• r 
er 4/1/80 
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.l..2/ The dissenting opinion asserts that 
the record reflects an "improper involvement of the 
judicial office in the prosecutorial function." 
Post, at 5. We find no basis for this contention. 
The District Court did not participate in the plea 
bargaining process: it merely undertook a 
retrospective review of the evidence regarding 
petitioner's character, record, and criminal 
conduct in accordance with applicable law. 18 
U.S.C. § 3577: Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(c). And a 1,. 
defendant who failed even to raise the possibility 
of self-incrimination or retaliation over a course 
of three years is hardly in a position to complain 
that he was "put to an unfair choice." Post, at 5. 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly con-
sidered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal 
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant. 
J[ 
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to 
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance 
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne 
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told 
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to peti-
tioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's sug-
gestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer 
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily, 
the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). They also told him that he 
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would 
stay, the investigtors asked whether he knew "Boo" Thorn-
ton , then the principal target of the heroin investigation. 
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton 
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed 
drug tr1;1,neactions with Thornton in certain intercepted te}e,,. 
2 
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code 
words used in the conversations. When asked to name sup-
pliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although 
the investigators warned petitioner tha,t the extent of -his 
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he 
provided no further information. 
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to dis-
tribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 841, 846, and four counts of using 
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 U. S. C. 
§ 843 (b).1 He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Govern .. 
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In 
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the con-
spiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years' 
imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground 
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately dis-
closed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977). 
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of tele-
phone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Govern-
ment to seek a substantial sentence. "The Government filed 
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. 2 "The memorandum 
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank 
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent 
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also empha-
sized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since 
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial 
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin 
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and 
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences 
1 Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could 
have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone. 
App. 36. 
2 The maximum sentence on each count was four years' imprisonment 
and a ·$30,000 fine. -21 U, S, C. § 843 (c) , 
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs 
for personal profit. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that peti-
tioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal 
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to proba-
tion. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concur-
rent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He 
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary 
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify 
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that 
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the 
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of 
"many, many years, knowing what he faces. '' Id., at 36. 
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into 
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that 
the defendant has cooperated. . . ." Ibid. Stressing the 
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitiga-
tion , the Government recommended a substantial prison term. 
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one 
to four years on each count and a special paroie term of three 
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained 
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was 
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the 
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to 
cooperate with the Government.3 Petitioner again appealed, 
contending for the first time that the sentendng court should 
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the spe-
cial parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. -
3 Before impo,.;ing sentence, the court explained : 
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have 
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which 
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this casE> you were 
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate w:ith 
the f'Qovernmeni.!' A pp. 40. 
4 
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U. S. App. D. C. - , 600 F. 2d 815 (1979). We granted 
certiorari, 440 U. S. - (1979), and we now affirm. 
II 
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United 
States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Con-
gress has directed that 
" [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a 
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of impos-
ing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577. 
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy 
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York, 
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the 
" fundamental sentencing principle" that " 'a judge may 
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may con-
sider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States 
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 
U. S. 443. 446 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process 
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinforma-
tion of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker, 
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740-741 
( 1948) . 
No such misinformation was present in this case. The 
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. 
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests 
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does 
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested 
assistance. Indeed. petitioner concedes that cooperation with 
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational 
- connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change 
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his behavior ... . " Brief for Petitioner 17 .4 Unless a differ-
ent explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in 
the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference 
that these laudable attitudes are lacking. 
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has 
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty 
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the 
authorities." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 ( 1972), 
was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as 
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth , History of 
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see 
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275); 
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1. chs. 1, 4, and 6, 
pp. 112-115 ( 1285) . The first Congress of the United States 
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone 
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain 
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and 
make known the same to [the appropriate] authority .. .. " 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113.5 Although the 
4 See, e. g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standards Relating to Plea::; of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968) ; 
id., at 48-49 ; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F. R. D. 
406 , 413-414 (1965) ; cf. R. Cross, The Engli::;h Sentencing System 170 
(1975) . 
We doubt that a principled di::;tinction may be drawn between "enhanc-
ing" the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The 
question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is 
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note, 
however, that .Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing peti-
tioner's first conviction, observed on t.he basis of his " complete familia rity 
with the facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's current sentence is 
a "very light " one. United States v. Roberts. 600 F. 2d 815, (1979) 
(Separate Statement on Denial of Rehearing en bane) . The sentence of 
two to eight years' imprisonment certain!~· was not a severe penalty for 
a "substantial drug distributor," ibid., who plied hi;; trade whilP on parole 
from a prior conviction for bank robbery. 
5 The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 U S. C § 4. It has 
6 
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross 
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior 
rema.ins a badge of irresponsible citizenship. 
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when 
the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities- himself. 
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no 
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities. 
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors 
of heroin in his own comm\mity in exchange for a favorable 
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner 
rejected an "obligatio [n] of community life" that should be 
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The 
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 
(1958). Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate protected 
his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to 
resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available 
to a sentencing judge are more relevant to "'the likelihood 
that [a defendantl will transgress no more, the hope that 
he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with -a 
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or 
does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United 
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States -v. 
Hendrix, 505 F . 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974) . 
III 
Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for 
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant 
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather 
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legiti-
mate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In 
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal 
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for· 
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime artd some affirmative• 
act of concealment or participatio1i." See· Branzbury v .· Hayes, 408 U. S .. 
665, 696, n. 36 (1972). 
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rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court 
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
These arguments would have merited serious consideration 
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge. 
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or 
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct 
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. ·The District Court had 
no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now 
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's 
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransi-
gency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer 
offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after 
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could 
be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner 
remained silent. 
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to 
remain silent and that no adverse inferences can be drawn 
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument sin-
gularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination · is not self-executing. At least 
where the government has no substantial reason to believe 
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, 
the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a 
timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653-
655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); 
see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976) 
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring in the judgment) .6 
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 
273 U. S. 103, 113 ( 1927) , petitioner "did not assert his privi-
6 The Court rrcognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 
659-661 ( 1976), that this rule is subject to exception when :;ome coercive 
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his 
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case. 
See p. -, infra. 
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lege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony 
because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination. 
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The 
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed 
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention 
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if 
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged, 
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court 
could ha.ve determined whether his claim was legitimate.7 
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by 
arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection 
for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence 
described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amend-
ment and adds nothing to it. Although Miranda's require-
ment of specific warnings creates a limited exception to. the 
rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does 
not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive cus-
todial interrogations for which it was designed. · The war_n-
ings protect persons who, exposed to such interrogation 
without th·e assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable 
to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v .. 
United States, supra, at 657.8 
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Peti-
tioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with 
1 See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, n. 11 ; Hoffman v. United 
States. 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 
364-366 (1917) ; United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76--77 (CA2 
1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to 
determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amend-
ment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A wit-
ness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he 
simply would prefer not to give. 
8ln United States v. Washington. 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), the 
Court explained that "[a] ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to 
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which 
tb.~ Court thoU'ght was cal.l.$ed_ by isolation of a sttspect in police custody."' 
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investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given 
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim 
that he was coerced.u Thereafter, petitioner was represented 
by couHsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that 
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to 
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he 
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither 
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwill-
ingness to provide information vital to law enforcement 
was based upon the right to remain si1ent or the fear of 
self-incrimination. 
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired 
his " 'free choice to admit. to deny, or to refuse to answer.' " 
Garner v. United States , 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U. S. 219. 241 (1941). His conduct bears no 
resemblance to the "iusolubly ambiguous•) post-arrest silence 
that may be induced by the assurances contained in Afiranda 
warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Oh·io, 426 U. S. 610. 617-618 ( 1976). 
We conclude that the District Court committed 110 constitu-
tional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner's sentellce on 
the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted inter-
ference with a function traditionally vested in the trial courts. 
See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424. 440-441 
(1974).10 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is 
Affirmed. 
9 The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under 
Miranda, v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), when he first confessed his 
involvement in the com;piracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v. 
Roberts, No. 75-619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n . 4. 
10 Thr di,-,;enting opinion f1,:1<<'I'ti- that thr rrcord reflrct;; nn " impmper 
inYoh·rment of thr ,i11dir-ial ofiicf' in thf' pro,-rentoriaJ f11netion. " Post. 
at. 5. Wf' find no ba><i:-- for thi,: ront.ention. The Di,..trirt Court did not 
participate in the plea-bargaining process : it mere!~· undertook a retro-
sprr.tivr rf',·ic,w of 1he rvidrnc-r regarding petitioner';; character, rrcord, and 
criminal coll(luct in accordance with a.pplirable law. IS U.S. C. § :{:i'i7; 
10 
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:Fed. Rulo Crim. Proo, 32 (c). And a defendmlt who failed even to rajse 
the p().:,Sibility of self-incri.mina,tion or retaliittion over a course of three years 
is harclly in a position to complain that he was "put to an unfair choice." 
Poat, at 5. 
.. 
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MR. J usTICE BRENNAN, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion. 
The principal divisive issue in this case is whether peti-
tioner's silence should have been miderstood to imply con-
tinued solicitude for his former criminal enterprise, rather 
than assertion of the Fifth Amendment right agai11st self-
incrimination or fear of retaliation. I agree with the Court 
that the trial judge cannot be faulted for drawing a negative 
inference from petitioner's noncooperation when petitioner 
failed to suggest that other, neutral, inferences were available. 
And because the government questioning to which he failed 
to respond was not directed at incriminating hilll. petitioner 
may not stand upon a Fifth Arnendlllent privilege that he 
never invoked at the time of his silence. See United States 
v. Mandujano , 425 U. S. 564. 589- 594 (1976) (BRENNAN, J ., 
concurring in the judgment); Garner v. United States, 424 
U.S. 648, 655-661 (1976); Vajtauer v. Commissfoner of hnmi-
gration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (19,27).* 
✓ 
,·when the go,·ernment act.uall~· ~eeks to incriminate the subject of 
questioning, failure to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege i,-, reviewed 
111Hlr r thr :;tringent "knowing [Ind cumpletel~· \'Olu11tar~· 1Yaiyer" :;tamlard . <{ 
U11ited States \', Mandujano, 425 U. s.w93 (1976) (BRKK~AX, J., concur- 5" ) 
ring in the judgment). But when it is only the subject who is reasonably 
a 1Yare of the incriminating tendency of the questions, it is his responsibili ty 
to put the government. on notiec by forma.Jly availing himself of the 
pri\'i lege, Id ., at 580-59-! ; Gomer v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 655 
,. - ~ 
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Nevertheless, the problem of drawjng inferences from ai't 
ambiguous silence is troubling. As a matter of due process, 
an offender may not be sentenced on the basis of mistaken 
facts or unfounded assumptions. Townsend v. Burke, 334 
U. S. 736, 740-741 (1948); see United States v. Grayson, 438 
U. S. 41 , 55 (1978) (STEWART, J., dissenting) (collateral in-
quiry may be required before sentence is enhanced because 
of trial judge's unreviewable impression that defendant per-
jured himself at trial). It is of comparable importance to 
assure that a defendant is not penalized on the basis of 
groundless inferences. At the least, sentencing judges should 
conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of silence where a 
defendant indicates before sentencing that his refusal to co-
operate is prompted by constitutionally protected, or morally 
defellsible, n10tives. Furthermore, especially where convic-
tion is based upon a guilty piea, it may be advisable for trial _ . ,L. ,,J 9t._ 
judges to raise the question of motive themselves when~ /7/\-t4UV-fUI' wi 
prosecutorial recommendation for severity due to an offender's 
noncooperation. During the Rule 32 allocAt10n before sen- -""' 
tencing. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (a)(l), the defendant could 
be asked on the record v,·hether he has a reasonable explana-
tion for his silence; if a justification were proffered, the judge 
would then proceed to determine its veracity and reasonable-
ness. Such an alloc{tion procedure would reduce the danger of 
erroneous inference and provide a record to support sentencing 
against subsequent challenge. Cf. McCarthy v. United 
States, 394 U. S. 459, 466- 467 (1969) (Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 
11 allocution procedure). 
(10, G) . At that point, the goyemment may either cease questioning or 
continue under a grant of immunity. 
(.) 
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CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 'J 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 78-1793. Argued January 14-15, 1980-Decided March-, 19: 
Held: The District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing 
consecutive sentences on petitioner who had pleaded guilty to two counts 
of using a telephone to faci litate the distribution of heroin, petitioner's 
refusal to cooperate with Government officials investigating a related 
criminal conspiracy to distribute heroin in which he was a confessed 
participant. Pp. 4-9. 
(a) No misinformation of constitutional magnitude was present in 
this case; petitioner rebuffed repeated requests for his cooperation over 
a period of three years and concedes that cooperation with the authori-
ties is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational connection to 
a defendant's willingness to shape up and change his behavior." By 
. declining to cooperate, petitioner rejected an obligation of community 
life that should be recognized before rehabilitation can begin and pro-
tected his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to 
resume criminal activities upon release. Pp. 4-6. 
. (b) Nor can petitioner's failure to cooperate be justified on the basis 
of fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination, or on the ground 
that the District Court punished him for exercising his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. These arguments were raised 
for the first. time in petitioner's appellate brief, neither petitioner nor 
his lawyer having offered any explanation to the sentencing court even 
though it was• known that petitioner's intransigency would be used 
against him. Although the requirement of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 436, of specific warnings creates a limited exception to the rule 
. that • the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing and 
must be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the 
inherently coercive custodial interrogation for which it was designed, 
and here there was no custodial interrogation. Petitioner volunteered 
his confession at his first interview with investigators, after Miranda 
I 
in syllabus. 
HENRY C. LIND 
Reporter of Decisions. 
,- .. 
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Syllabus 
warnings had been given and at a time when he was free to leave. For 
the next three years until the time when he received the sentence he 
now challenges, neither he nor his counsel-who were both fully apprised 
that the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to affect 
his sentence-ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to cooperate 
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of self-incrimina-
tion . Pp. 6-9. 
- U. S. App. D. C. -, 600 F. 2d 815, affirmed. 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, 
JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion. MARSHALL, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion._ 
- -
No. 78-1793 Roberts - v~ - United - States 
This criminal case comes to us on certiorar1/from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. The question is whether the defendant's failure 
to cooperate with the authoritieywas a proper factor for 
consideration/ in determining his sentence. The Court of 
Appeals held that it was. 
The petitioner ~n~iclG- Hoaer~ confessed 
~ 
involvement/ in a ~oin conspiracy, butArefused to identify 
others who had participated in the crime. The District Court 
'?-t!.,-hv' 
imposed a heavy sentence. It explained that --Rebe~ts was a 
~~ 
d~r. who "saa Athe ~;~~~i ty / and failed to cooperate with 
the Government." 
Petitioner's unwillingness to 
enforcement/ suggested the possibility of 
assist law 
~
an i-M:-e-nt to return 
" to dealing in narcotics. It also suggested that petitioner 
would not respond affirmatively to rehabilitation. 
~. ~~ 
~~~ r ~ 
 !--0 , 
- -
2. 
J.--:;!;:-~ffered no explanation/ or his declining to 
cooperate. 
J7 .. £.i·~. 
Nor did ~oe-er~s claim that his silence was an 
exercise of the Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-
Incrimination. As he failed to 
time when its legitimacy could 
~ 
right to claim it on appeal. 
invoke the privilege/ at a 
be determined,/ he waived his 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is affirmed. Mr. JUSTICE BRENNAN has filed a concurring 
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